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CHAPTER 9 
SOCIAL AND INTERNAL ECONOMIC 
AFFAIRS* 
In discussing the economic situation of Iran from the 14th to the 1 8th 
century, it seems to us helpful to keep two essential sectors distinct 
from one another: on the one hand the economy of the open country-
side (above all, agriculture, cattle-breeding, hunting, fishing and 
mining) and on the other hand the urban economy ( commerce and 
industry). Let us turn initially to the sector of rural production, with 
agriculture and cattle-breeding as its predominant elements. This 
created to a great extent the basis for almost all the economic activities 
we shall encounter in the period we are to treat. Subsequently the 
development of the various forms and institutions of landholding will 
have to be examined. Thereafter we shall treat the urban sectors of the 
economy (home trade and industrial production), and we shall end 
with a description of the financial and taxation systems. 
THE RURAL ECONOMY 
In the framework of agrarian production we encounter above all two 
sharply demarcated social groups. While the settled peasants mostly 
devote themselves to agriculture, cattle-breeding is above all in the 
hands of nomads and semi-nomads. Let us first discuss some character-
istic features of peasant production in our period. 
The damage clone to Iran's agriculture by the Mongol invasion 
showed .its effects for centuries, and it is questionable whether the 
country, down to the end of the Safavid period, ever regained the 
degree of prosperity that distinguished Iranian agriculture from the 
4th/1oth to the 6th/12th century, though there were indeed regional 
exceptions. The reasons for this setback lay above all in the destruction 
of irrigation works, some of them centuries old, and in the deforesta-
tion and depopulation of the country: both of the latter were direct 
consequences of the Mongol invasion. Further devastation occurred in 
* This chapter was completed in 197z. lt has not been possible, therefore, to take into account 
work which has appeared since that date. 
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tural products; as in earlier and later times, the main cereals were wheat 
and barley, the latter mainly as fodder. In the Caspian coastal areas rice-
growing held first place; it was also to be found to a limited extent in 
the I~fahän area. Sugar-cane had already been cultivated in Khüzistän 
since the time of the Sasanians. Fruit-growing was not exclusively 
confined to plantations in the vicinity of towns; however, it always 
required favourable meam of irrigation. Essentially the same kinds of 
fruit were cultivated as in our own day. Cotton-growing and the rear-
ing of silkworms were widespread, the latter mainly around Yazd, in 
Khuräsän and in Gilän on the Caspian coast. Wine-production was not 
unusual and mostly found in the vicinity of the vineyards themselves. 
lt is, of course, not surprising that (Christian) Armenians and 
Georgians were especially active in this trade. Saffron, which was in 
great demand, came mostly from Khuräsän. In districts where there 
was hardly any frost in winter, figs and above all dates were harvested. 
There were extensive date-plantations everywhere in Khüzistän and 
also in the province of Kirmän and on the Caspian coast. Olives and 
citrus fruits were grown in the climatically favoured districts, limes 
especially in the fertile areas by the Persian Gulf, and Persian bitter 
oranges (narao/) mainly on the shores of the Caspian and in Kirmän. 
The cultivation of sweet oranges (purtaqal) also increased after the 
contacts with the Portuguese, i.e. in the 1 7th and 1 8th centuries, but it 
did not reach the same extent as today. Cultivation of poppies (for the 
extraction of opium) and hemp was widespread in all areas. 
As has been indicated above, in Iran irrigation was a decisive factor 
for every kind of agriculture. The following irrigation techniques have 
been handed down from the 11th/17th century: surface irrigation with 
water from springs or rivers; "underground" irrigation from deep 
wells (chah) fed by ground-water; and irrigation by means of qanät ( or 
kariz), underground channels, expensive to construct, which were 
driven through strata carrying ground-water. These methods are 
known weil before the 8th/14th century and are still practised today. 1 
Orchards and plantations, as we have already mentioned, required a 
greater supply of water than simple agriculture. We therefore find this 
type of cultivation mostly in places where surface irrigation with river-
water was possible. In the crown provinces of the 1 ith/17th century 
the ruler had a monopoly of water and leased it to the holders of fiefs 
1 Chardin rv, 1or. I:Iamd-Alläh MustaufI, Nuzhatal-qulüb, text pp. 132, 133, 144, 14), zz r, etc. 
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and to peasants. Thus the Band-i amir dam in Färs, for example, which 
went back to the Buyid epoch, is said to have brought in some 
thousand tiimäns annually for the royal treasury. 1 In a similar way, in 
other areas the landlord at any given time had special rights of owner-
ship with regard to water and irrigation works. lt hardly needs to be 
emphasised that the irrigation problem was of an entirely different 
character in the humid Caspian provinces. 
Because of the limited range of the irrigation systems, agricultural 
operations were always restricted to a speci6c cultivation area; it there-
fore proved necessary to manure the exhausted and meagre soil regu-
la~ly. For the most part the dung of asses, cattle, camels and sheep 
served the purpose, and the fertilising effect of human excreta was also 
highly esteemed. The cesspits of town houses were therefore emptied 
regularly by local peasants coming to market, in order that they could 
transfer this valuable material to their 6elds and gardens. Generally all 
the rubbish of the towns was - as it still is - carefully gathered up by 
peasants and used as fertiliser. 2 Ox and camel dung were also used as 
fuel. lt was a very common practice to use the ground-up remnants of 
decayed mud walls, which had been made durable by an admixture of 
fermented straw and chaff and thus contained valuable chemicals. 
Pigeon droppings were held to be the most valuable fertiliser. Even 
today strangely shaped pigeon towers (kabiitarkhäna) are a character-
istic feature of the environs of I~fahan; often up to ten thousand birds 
nest in them. These buildings, of which similar examples are found at 
al-Fayyüm in Egypt, date back to the 11th century. Every day con-
siderable quantities of the precious salpetre-like substance were - and 
still are - obtained from them. In former times a fixed tax was levied by 
the state for the erection of these towers.3 
Landlords and wealthy peasants used to store up large quantities of 
cereals for considerable periods. For this purpose they generally used 
large vessels, in which the goods to be kept were covered over with 
dry straw and sand. lt was also customary to bury stores in large dry 
holes in the ground and cover them with sand. Apples, for example, 
could be kept for a whole year in this manner. Peasants often buried 
their harvest produce, to keep it out of the reach of tax-collectors, 
highwaymen or predatory nomads. 
1 Kaempfer, p. 94. 2 Du Mans, p. 2n. Chardin rv, 103. 
3 Chardin m, 386-7. 
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We should add a word on mills and milling. There were mills in 
many districts; these, however, did not always belang to the peasant 
production sector, since their products (meal and flour, especially 
wheat-flour, and oils in the case of oil-mills) were in great measure 
intended for urban consumers. The meal needed for private use was 
generally ground by the peasants themselves. From the technological 
point of view there were mainly two types of mills: those driven by 
draught animals and - along watercourses - watermills. There was 
probably a trend towards an increasing number of watermills; these 
were in general use in the 17th century. There are also said to have 
been windmills in some parts of the country, e.g. in Khuräsän. 1 
The settled peasants practised cattle-breeding only to a limited de-
gree, usually only for the reproduction of draught animals and possibly 
also to satisfy their own very modest demand for meat. Poultry -
preferably chickens and pigeons, and in the Caspian regions also ducks 
- was bred mostly in the vicinity of the towns, obviously with a view 
to being sold in the markets. The major part in satisfying the demand 
for meat was played by the nomad cattle-breeders, whose extensive 
flocks and herds - mostly sheep and goats, camels, and in Khüzistän 
also buffaloes - were to be met with everywhere. There had been 
nomad tribes in Iran even before the arrival of the Turks and Mongols 
- Kurds, Bakhtiyärs, Lurs, Balüchis (all of lranian origin), and 
Bedouin Arabs (e.g. the Banü Ka'b) in Khüzistän (" 'Arabistän"). In 
the period under discussion here, the tribes of Turkish origin were 
predominant. In addition, ethnically very heterogeneous tribes had 
developed in the 11-Khanid period under the leadership of Mongol 
soldiers; these probably succumbed to far-reaching Turkicisation 
during the 8th/14th and 9th/15th centuries. Each tribe had at its dis-
posal a clearly defined and extensive pasture area, consisting of a sum-
mer pasture (yailaq) and a winter pasture (qiShlaq), which might often be 
at a great distance from one another. The summer pastures lay in the 
highlands, while the winter pastures were always tobe found in exten-
sive lowland tracts. The tribes were divided into sub-tribes and clans; 
the smallest organisational unit was a nomad household consisting of 
several tents (Turkish öba). The total pasture territory of a tribe was 
calledyurt.2 The supreme authority over a yurt was exercised by the 
t Petrushevsky, Kishävarzir, 2631f. Du Mans, p. 243. 
2 TMEN rr, 132 ff. (no. 572). Petrushevsky, Kishävarzi rr, 77. For the yurt under Timür, cf. 
Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, p. 100. 
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members of the tribal aristocracy, headed by the chief. Even though 
the flocks and herds were regarded as the communal property of the 
tribe concerned, they were in fact controlled by the leaders of the tribe, 
whose decisions were generally accepted because of their rank and 
prestige. The strict discipline prevailing within the tribes was also 
connected with the fact that every Turkish nomad tribe, down to the 
time of 'Abbäs I and to a lesser degree even later, was at the same time 
also a military unit and the tribal hierarchy was generally identical with 
the military hierarchy. We have already mentioned that the nomads 
met the demand for meat. Besides this, they also produced wool, 
supplied hides, did a small amount of tanning and made milk products 
of various kinds. They lived in tents; whereas the Mongolian feit tent 
(known as yurt) has been used in north-eastern Iran down to the 
present day, the type called the "black tent" came into general use in 
the central highlands and in western Iran from the Mongol period 
onwards. A "black tent" consisted of specially-cut pieces made of spun 
goat's wool. This was an excellent heat-insulating material, and the 
tents made of it were probably more mobile than the robust yurt. In 
Khüzistän the wandering herdsmen and shepherds also made them-
selves reed huts, which could be quickly erected. The economic aim of 
the nomad cattle-breeders was a constant enlargement of their stock; it 
must however be remembered that the annual increase was very much 
lessened by consumption for their own needs and by substantial sur-
rendering of cattle to the state or the court and above all to the 
superiors of the tribe and to its leader. Cattle-dealing on a larger scale 
was carried on only by tribal leaders and their subordinates; these also 
made the greatest profits. More and more the leaders of tribes settled in 
the towns, above all in times of peace, and especially when they exer-
cised administrative functions, as for example the Qizilbäsh governors. 
They thus became somewhat estranged from the way of life of their 
fellow-tribesmen, but never to such a degree as to risk losing their 
absolute authority. These were not the only circumstances in which 
there was a community of interests between the nomad leaders and the 
traditional landlords. As we shall see later, in the course of the 14th, 
15th and 16th centuries, tribal chiefs were often the possessors oflarge 
"fiefs" or beneficia and thereby combined two social functions. 
Hunting and fishing were probably always of limited economic im-
portance. Hunting was practised as a sport by the genteel and rich; 
apart from this it was also one of the special characteristics of nomad 
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life. Among the settled population, large-scale hunting and fishing were 
carried on only in the Caspian coastal areas, where game and 6sh were 
plentiful; there was also fishing in the waters of the Persian Gulf. For 
obvious reasons, the exploitation of fish was confined to the regions 
concerned. In general, the consumption of fish or game (chiefly gazelles, 
wild goats and game birds) was unusual among the town-dwellers of the 
interior of the Iranian plateau, except at court and in wealthy households, 
where such things were regarded as special delicacies. lt gave 'Abbäs 1 
particular pleasure to prepare with his own hands game that he had killed 
and to have it served to his guests and hunting companions.1 
Finally, a few words about the exploitation of mineral resources. In 
the 17th century at least, the Crown held sovereign rights over mining, 
salt-production and pearl~fishing. The yield from these formed an es-
sential source of revenue for the royal treasury. Among the most 
valuable mining products were the turquoises from the celebrated 
mines near Nishäpiir. The exploitation of these mines was from time to 
time prohibited by the shah. Large quantities of copper were extracted 
in Khuräsän and above all in Kirmän, while the gold and silver mines 
of Iran were already so exhausted in the 11th/17th century that it was 
no longer possible to work them. Lead came mainly from Y azd and 
Kirmän; iron was extracted in Khuräsä.n. Lastly, sulphur, mercury 
and antimony were also mined.2 The demand for salt was satisfied by 
the rich rock-salt deposits of Iran; there were also of course extensive 
salt-works in the Persian Gulf area, where sea-salt was obtained by 
evaporation. Travellers made particular mention of such salt-works, 
especially in Hurmuz.3 We must also remember the mineral oil de-
posits in the Bä.kii and Khiizistän (Shushtat) area. Sometimes the exploi-
tation of "oil-wells" (chäh-i naft) was incumbent upon local landlords; 
these wells were of course only gushers.4 
W e must also mention the dangers that threatened the existence of 
large parts of the population in every age - namely, natural disasters of 
various kinds. The most serious of these were crop failures and the 
ensuing famines: they were caused by lack of precipitation during the 
winter months, and they weighed most heavily on the rural popula-
tion. The consequences of a period of drought affected not only the 
1 FalsafI, Zindagänirv, z5. 2 Kaempfer, p. 94. 
3 lbid. L'ouvrage de Sryfi <;elebi, historien ottoman du XVle siicle, ed. and trans. J. Matuz (Paris, 
1968), pp. 142-3. 
4 Kaempfer, p. 94. Petrushevsky, "K istorii instituta 'soyurgala' ", pp. z4zlf. 
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settled peasants but also nomad herdsmen and cattle-breeders; it often 
took five years or more to re-establish a herd that bad been decimated 
by drought and lack of pasture. 
In the borderlands of the Great Desert the daily battle for water was 
coupled with fighting off the wind-borne sand that bad for thousands 
of years been endeavouring to bury the settlements lying there. Walls 
bad to be built to protect fields and gardens, and the advancing desert 
continually threatened to dry up the essential wells and destroy the 
irrigation systems. 
Iran is one of the most restless tectonic zones on earth; in conse-
quence of this, disastrous earthquakes occurred repeatedly. Those who 
suffered most from them were villagers living in frail mud huts, but 
hardly anyone escapcd unhurt in an affected area. 
Diseases and epidemics, often intensified by lack of water and 
absence of hygiene, also endangered many lives. The towns were es-
pecially prone to epidemics because of the crowded living conditions 
in high-concentration centres: the plague epidemic at Herat in the year 
838/1435 as described by 'Abd al-Razzäq SamarqandI is an instance of 
this. In such cases, the sparsely populated flat country proved to be a 
cordon sanitaire by which the epidemic could be prevented from spread-
ing to other towns. In the rural areas, however, diseases like cholera, 
typhoid fever, dysentery and malaria were endemic, especially in Gilän, 
Khiizistän and the coastal areas by the Persian Gulf; they were dreaded 
- not without cause - by European travellers, and in every age they 
were a <langer to the rural population. 
THE VARIOUS FORMS AND INSTITUTIONS OF LANDHOLDING 
lt is hardly possible to give a simple definition of all the forms of 
landholding which existed in the period under discussion. At one end 
of the scale there was private ownership; at the other there were 
beneficia, privileges and tax-farming ; while in between came grants 
somewhat reminiscent of the European "fief" and for which that term 
will be employed in this chapter, although it should be noted that they 
did not correspond to it at all points. 
The institutions already existing in the Mongol period under-
went various changes between the 14th and the I 8th century. Further-
more in the course of time a number of new concepts and institutions 
arose, which in practice again changed rapidly and probably assumed 
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different forms in different areas of Iran. Clarification of the problem of 
landholding is also complicated by the fact that the legal concepts of 
landlordship do not always give a true picture of the actual situation. In 
the following exposition we will try, as far as possible, to explain the 
various institutions on the basis of their legal definitions and to describe 
how they worked in practice, how they developed and changed in the 
course of time, and how new types of landlordship emerged. 
In principle, the following categories of land were recognised from 
the 'Abbasids onwards: (i) dTvaniland (state land), (ii) mulk land (private 
estates), (iii) vaqf land ( charitable or religious endowment land), and 
(iv) khaf!a land (crown land).1 However, this ideal scheme cannot be 
applied to our period without closer scrutiny. Within the category of 
"state land" in particular there was a bewildering mass of institutions 
by which the state's title to land was, to a greater or lesser degree, 
transferred to individuals. Let us first clarify the concept. All areas 
whose tax revenues were at the disposal of the state were regarded as 
divänI land. Part of this income was used to finance the civil service 
and the military; especially from the Mongol period onwards the au-
thorities no langer restricted themselves to collecting the traditional 
khartij (land tax), but levied a number of special taxes. These did not 
conform with the religious law, but were generally legitimised in the 
11-Khanid period by the Yäsa, the code of Chingiz Khän. Their num-
bers, and the amounts required, varied at different times and in differ-
ent places.z lt was the normal practice for the tax officials ('ummal) of 
the time to collect the prescribed taxes on the spot. For centuries, 
however, this procedure had already been breached by the granting of 
fiscal privileges and beneficia. The most widespread forms of benefi-
cium - already under the Buyids and particularly from the Saljüq 
period onwards - consisted of the various types of iqtil .3 This institu-
tion was based on the procedure that high officials or military leaders 
were not paid in cash, but each received the tax revenue of a certain 
territory instead. In other words, the iqtä' consisted above all in the 
state's yielding the right of tax collection to individual persons. In 
those cases where this procedure represented a substitute for salary, 
1 Cf. Petrushevsky, in CHI v, l 1 l · 
2 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", especially p. 191. Minorsky, "The Aq-qoyunlu and 
Land Reforms". Minorsky and Minovi, "Na~Ir al-Din TiisI on finance". 
3 Becker, "Steuerpacht", pp. S9 ff. Cahen, "L'evolution de l'iqta'". Lambton, Landlord and 
Peasant, pp. 53/f. Petrushevsky, Kishävarzin, 4j-6j. 
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this right was attached to the performance of certain administrative or 
military duties within the framework of the state. lt was therefore 
neither transferable nor hereditary on the part of the holder of the 
beneficium. This stipulation, however, remained legal theory, especially 
with regard to the military iqtä'. The army of the Great Saljiiq state was 
based on nomadic Turkish tribal formations, and every tribal unit was at 
the same time also a military unit. Just as the leader's rank was hereditary 
within the hierarchy of the tribe, so also his state function (as a military 
leader) passed to his heir, and thus the iqtä' in question became de facto 
the basis of subsistence for several generations of tribal leaders. Ni?äm 
al-Mulk had still required that the iqta""'-där (also muqfa', holder of an 
iqtä') should have no direct contact with the peasants of his iqtä' and 
should confine himself exdusively to collecting the dues. However, 
towards the end of the 6th/ 1 2 th century the iqtä' -därs regarded their 
beneficia as hereditary property. If one considers that the iqtä'-där's 
family had already held the beneficium for some generations and the 
iqtä'-där himself had military forces under his control, one can easily 
understand that he was interested in something more than the tax yield 
of the territory assigned to him. To an increasing extent he appropriated 
to himself sovereign rights over the territory, and at the beginning of the 
8th/14th century the term iqtä' signified not only the ceding of the 
beneficium but also the actual land concerned. The central power -
insofar as one existed - and the legal institutions connected with it did 
not always recognise this state of affairs. They held fast to the principle 
that the iqtä' was a beneficium attached to a person and his function. 
This proceeding was justified, insofar as the spreading and development 
of the military iqtä' system in the time of the Great Saljüqs had undoubt-
edly played a large part in bringing about the collapse of their state. 
Moreover, there was probably little indination to reconcile the legal 
recognition of the hereditary character of the iqtä', and the sovereign 
rights exercised by the iqtä'-där, with the principle of religious law that 
the Caliph or the ruler was the owner of all land. 
Further development of the iqtä' was stimula.ted in the Mongol 
period. Under the Il-Khäns the military-nomadic element had gained 
the upper hand in every sphere of life. After the administrative and 
economic reforms under Ghazan Khän and his vizier Rashid al-Din 
there existed a form of iqtä' that no longer had anything much in 
common with the original fiscal beneficium: the iqtä'-där was the head 
of a military unit organised on a tribal basis, the commander of a force 
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of anything from a thousand to ten thousand men. His iqtä' was 
hereditary and his powers were so extensive that he was able to re-
grant sections of his iqtä', as subinfeudations, so to speak, to subordi-
nate commanders (tribal sub-leaders). The holders of the various su-
binfeudations were inspected annually, however, by state officials to 
make sure that they fulfilled all the duties arising from their grants, 
especially with regard to military service. Any such holder who was 
found unworthy was deprived of the right to his beneficium. This 
was a highly developed form of the authority of amirs - military 
commanders, as can be deduced from the foregoing, and mainly of 
Turco-Mongolian origin - over what were often very extensive areas 
of cultivated land, including the settled population living on and 
dependent on this land for their livelihood. The break-up of the 
11-Khanid state and the consequent weakening of all the elements 
of the central administration increased the independence of the amirs in 
all parts of the country. From this form of a large-scale military iqta' in 
the Mongol period, as we have just described it, a new institution 
developed under the Jalayirids around the middle of the 8th/14th cen-
tury which gave its beneficiaries the greatest power over cultivated 
land and its people that a . landlord could achieve in the following 
centuries of Iranian history. This was the S11Jiirghäl, which we shall 
discuss later. 
The development of the iqtä' during the Saljüq and Mongol periods 
had of course not led to the disappearance of the iqtä' in its original 
sense by the middle of the 8th/ 14th century or later. lt had been 
customary, under the rule of all the dynasties with which we are 
concerned, to pay officials or clergy by granting them the tax revenue 
of certain places or districts, and by the Safavid period a whole series of 
modifications of this procedure had developed. These various forms 
differ from one another chiefly because of the fact that often only parts 
of the tax revenue were granted - shares of total amounts, or merely 
the yield of certain tax sources - or else because the areas on which the 
calculations were based might be of widely differing extent. Moreover, 
the grant might be subject to certain conditions. 
The following methods of procedure are in part known from the 
Jalayirid period. Firstly, the idrär; an idrär grant gave the beneficiary 
the right to claim a fixed share of the kharäj revenues from a defined 
area. His title to this fixed sum was generally hereditary and was 
conferred, at least nominally, by the ruler. This procedure was basically 
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the same as an earlier institution called iqfä' -i ijära. 1 lt should be said 
incidentally that an idrär might consist not only of shares of agricul-
tural taxes but also of shares of taxes on commerce and property 
(tamgha). A non-hereditary form of idrär was also known, namely the 
idrär-i ma'isha, which was only valid for the beneficiary's lifetime. In 
both cases the idrär could be converted into a muqäf[a by decree of the 
ruler. 
A muqä~~a differed from an idrär in that it granted not shares of 
taxes but regular shares of property; like the idrär, it was either for life 
only (muqäf[a-yi ma'isha) or devisable. The hereditary nature of a grant 
was usually expressed by the term abadi ("eternal", "perpetual") and 
sometimes by sarmadi ("eternal"), or else by a combination of the two 
words, abadi va sarmadi. For a hereditary muqä~~a there was also the 
formulation muqäffa-yi idrär. In many respects the muqä~~a corre-
sponded to the iqfä' -i tamlik of earlier periods.2 With the establishment 
of a muqä~~a the land in question was removed from the authority of 
the divän, and in the case of an "eternal" muqä~~a there was little 
likelihood that the granted land would ever again be available for the 
profit of the divän. The holder of the muqä~~a also enjoyed some 
degree of administrative immunity; in a muqä~~a decree there appears 
the set formula which was still in use in the following centuries, qalam 
va qadam kutäh va kashida därand ("secured against the pen, protected 
against access", or si11P introitu iudicum); this formula indicated the trans-
fer of administrative rights from the official mentioned in the deed to 
the holder of the grant.3 lt is, however, possible that in this particular 
case the formula refers only to tax officials. The advantages of the 
muqä~~a over the simple idrär were above all that the holder of the 
muqä~~a not only had taxation rights but also received the landlord's 
shares of the crops due to him as part owner or exclusive owner. In any 
case, the rights accruing to the landlord from a muqä~~a-yi idrär were 
entirely similar to those attached to a large military iqtä'. The decisive 
criterion was probably the size of the area in question. In terms of 
form, these two procedures had created the basis for the development 
of the suyürghäl.4 Idrär and muqä~~a - even when they were only 
ma' isha ("for life") - carried too many advantages to the holder for 
them to be used exclusively for the purpose of paying salaries. lt can 
1 L0kkegaard, p. '9· 2 Cf. Lambton, Landlord and Peasanf, pp. 28ff. 
3 Cf. Petrushevsky, Kishävarziu, 70, quoting Nakhchiväni, Dastiir al-kätib. 
4 Ibid., pp. 66-72. 
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therefore be assumed that the recipients of idrär and muqä~~a could 
claim meritorious services as grounds for this distinction; they were 
probably deserving oflicials, the ruler's favourites, and religious 
dignitaries. These last were, in the 9th/ 1 5 th century and also in the 
Safavid period, largely holders of smaller and medium-sized suyür-
ghäls, with which the muqä~~a had a good deal in common. On the 
other hand, the idrär was continued in later times in the form of 
payment of salaries by means of barät (tax cheques; see below) and in 
the mustamarri, which was, down to the Qäjär period, understood as 
the payment of a pension to deserving persons. There are also con-
nections between the idrär and the payment of a va~/fa in certain cases 
that are known from the later Safavid period. A va?1fa was 
understood as the payment of an annuity or the grant of certain rights 
of landholding to members of the religious dass; normally vaqf land 
formed the basis of a va?1fa, and we shall return to this subject when 
discussing vaqf land. Va?tfa annuities could also be paid out of tax 
revenues from d1vän1 land, and in this case we are strongly reminded 
of the idrär. The assignment of a va?tfa had, however, to be renewed 
every year.1 The same condition existed in the case of a yak-säla (in 
füll, barät-i yak-säla, i.e. one-year tax cheque).2 As this method of 
effecting payment out of tax revenues from certain areas - a method 
known from the Safavid period - was applied exclusively to salaries, 
we shall deal with it later on. 
We see then that various forms of "feudal" rule were exercised not 
only by amirs, local princes and provincial governors, who belonged 
to the arbäb-i saif ("men of the sword"), but also by civilian landlords, 
who belonged to the arbäb-i qalam ("men of the pen", oflicials) or to 
the arbäb-i 'amä'im ("men of the turbans", i.e. 'ulamä, shaikhs, sayyids, 
teachers). But the most perfect forms of such "feudal" rule are encoun-
tered in the 9th/ 1 5 th and as late as the IOth/ 16th century within the 
framework of the institution we have repeatedly mentioned here, the 
suyürghäl. Before pursuing the history of this institution from the later 
14th century to the early 18th century we will try to demonstrate some 
of its main characteristics. 
The Mongol word sqyurghal originally meant nothing more than 
"act of favour" (from the ruler), "grant", or "donation". The expres-
1 Cf. Busse, Unters11&b11ngen, pp. 111ff.; on a va?ifa from state funds, see ibid., document no. 13. 
2 Chardin v, 410. Minorsky, Ta!l!J.brat al-M11/ük, pp. 19, 1l3. 
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sion Sl!Jürghämishi already had this general significance under the 
Il-Khäns. The first known occurrence of the word as the designation of 
a certain kind of "fief" is in the Jalayirid period. 1 The holder of a 
suyiirghäl (!äNb-sl!Jürghäl) enjoyed a number of rights over the estate in 
question. Above all - and this bad already been characteristic of the 
iqtä' - he was entitled to the tax yield of his area andin addition 
exercised rights of ownership over the tract of land in question (which 
was also called suyiirghäl). Furthermore, the suyiirghäl carried with it 
exemption from taxes; this point was always mentioned separately in 
the deeds conferring suyürghäls. Thus a superficial inspection of the 
documents might give the impression that the privilege of tax-exemp-
tion (mu'iifi, musallami) was a separate element from the suyürghäl. 
This is not quite correct; every suyürghäl grant shows at the same 
time the granting of immunity from taxes, and in many cases it is also 
stated that even in the event of an indease in the tax yield, e.g. of the 
kharäj by virtue of rising productivity, or of the poll-tax Uizya) when 
the population of non-Muslims living in the suyürghäl area had 
grown, the surplus was to go to the holder of the suyiirghäl.2 This 
usage can hardly be explained by saying that the divän authority had 
wanted to recognise the suyürghäl only as a beneficium, in order to 
prevent too great a concentration of power in the hands of the land-
lord. The deed, as drawn up, rather served the landlord as a legal 
instrument that he could produce in order to defend himself success-
fully against the local and regional tax officials if they made tax claims 
on the suyürghäl land. The same problem arises with the other privi-
leges pertaining to a suyiirghäl "fief", namely those of administrative 
immunity and hereditary rights. Just as immunity from taxes was 
very often indicated by a detailed list of all the relevant dues, so also 
the previously mentioned formula for administrative immunity was in 
most cases preceded by a list of all the officials who were forbidden to 
set foot on the territory of the suyiirghäl or to make demands upon 
it. The formula we have already quoted, qalam va qadam kutäh va kashi-
da därand, was usually employed for the administrative autonomy of 
the ~äl.üb-suyürghäl. Besides this, the following expression might be 
used: 'ummäl ba-hich vrfih min al-vl!}üh dar än madkhal nasäzand ("the tax 
officials may not penetrate there under any circumstances"). This is 
1 Petrushevsky, "K istorii instituta 'soyurgala'", p. 228. For the etymology, see TMEN 1, 
3 5 1-4 (nos. zz8, "soyiirgäl", 229, "soyiirgämliff"). 
2 Busse, Untersuchungen, p. 98. Petrushevsky, "K istorii instituta 'soyurgala'", p. 238. 
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found in a deed of Rustam Aq Quyünlü dated 27 Ramac;län 902/29 
May 1497. Otherwise the administrative and associated legal preroga-
tives were simply listed in full detail, as in suyürghäl deeds of Jahan 
Shäh Qara Quyünlü dated 3 Rajah 859/19 June 145 5 and of Shah 
Ismä'il 1dated10 Rajah 915/24 Octoher 1509.1 
On the demise of the ~al:iih-suyürghäl the "fief" passed to his heirs; 
the Muslim law of inheritance was, however, not necessarily observed. 
The transfer was always confirmed by the drawing up of a deed, 
generally on the part of the ruler.2 But this is not to he taken as 
implying that the heirs would always have needed the ruler's explicit 
assent. The rights to the existing suyürghäl could he simply transferred 
to the heir or heirs. lt was very much in the interests of the new holder 
of the suyürghäl to have a deed recording the transfer; he could then 
use this against anyorie who was trying to restrict his suyürghäl terri-
tory or his prerogative. We can deduce from the text of many suyür-
ghäl deeds, especially from such confirmations, that particular clauses 
were inserted for specific reasons. The advantages the suyürghal 
brought to its holder were often accompanied hy conditions, especially 
with regard to military service, or at least the ohligation to provide a 
numher of well-equipped warriors. But there were also suyürghäls that 
were free from any ohligations. This was especially the case with 
religious dignitaries to whom suyürghals were granted, a custom prac-
tised under the Timurids and also in the Türkmen and Safavid 
periods.3 In such cases the suyürghal was in the nature of a distinction; 
moreover, this act on the part of the ruler was often interpreted as 
payment of the ohligatory zakät (alms tax),4 since it was fundamentally 
a matter of pious conduct. With such an interpretation, attention could 
also he called to the fact that a large numher of receivers of alms were 
supported out of the income of a religious suyürghal-holder, even 
though the heneficiaries might in many cases have heen merely the 
working ra'äya of the suyürghal. lt was also possihle for non-religious 
personages to receive such suyürghals of "distinction", as in the case of 
the poet Salman Savaji. s 
With smaller suyürghals it could happen that the material basis 
1 For these three documents, see respectively Roemer, "Le dernier lirman", p. 286; Aubin, 
"Un soyurghal Qara-Qoyunlu", p. 161; Martin, "Seven :;'>afavid Documents", p. 180. 
2 'Abd al-Razzäq, Matla' al-sa'dain, ed. M. Shafi' (Lahore, 1941-9), p. 682. 
3 E.g. Lambton, "Two :;>afawid Soyürghäls"; Khwänd Amir rv, 43 1. 
4 Minorsky, "The Aq-qoyunlu and Land Reforms", p. 413· Busse, Untersuchungen, pp. 99-1or. 
s Daulatshäh, p. 260. 
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of the suyürghal was not the title to the entire tax yield from the 
suyürghal area, but only a claim to certain tax revenues. These were 
either defined as a specific sum of money or else limited to specific tax 
sources. In such cases the prerogative rights of the ~a}:iib-suyürghal 
were of course also reduced. 
Suyürghal land could thus be of varying extent. There were 
suyürghals on villages, and indeed even on parts of villages; but small 
or large districts, and even entire provinces, could be granted as 
suyürghal. In the case of large suyürghals the prerogative rights and 
the material basis enjoyed by the holder were so extensive that he could 
acquire not only economic, but also political power. In any case, the 
institution of suyürghal formed a basis for all the forces in the state that 
were opposed to centralisation. lt is therefore not surprising that we 
find the largest suyürghals, in terms of both territory and absoluteness 
of prerogative rights, in the 9th/ 1 5 th century. In loose political confed-
erations like those of the Qara Quyünlü and Aq Quyünlü (and also the 
Timurids) large territories were granted as suyürghal. When new areas 
came under the sovereignty of the state the former territories of the 
local rulers were often returned to them as suyürghal. As one surveys 
the conditions and characteristics of the suyürghal and compares them 
with the administrative system of governorships in the 15th century, 
one comes to the inevitable conclusion that the governorships, in every 
case where the governor belonged to the military aristocracy or to the 
ruling house, to some extent represented gigantic suyürghals. 1 When, 
for instance, Uzun .f:Iasan Aq Quyünlü wanted to abolish the tamgha 
(the municipal trade taxes, which were forbidden by religious law), he 
had to give up his intention in fa<;:e of the resistance of the amirs, i.e. 
the Türkmen military leaders;2 obviously most or all of them were 
entitled to a share of the tax yield not only of villages but also of towns. 
As the "fiefs" of the tribal military leaders (in fact, these very amirs) in 
particular were not restricted to individual settlements but also in-
cluded living-space for the members of their tribes, this practice is clear 
evidence for the territorial extension of their suyürghals - and it was 
certainly these that were involved, since the suyürghal had to a great 
extent superseded the other forms of military "fief" during the 
Türkmen period. lt may be assumed that there were several towns in 
1 For such grants from the Timurid period, see Togan, "Büyük Türk hükümdan ~ahruh", 
p. iz;; Yakubovsky, "Timur", sect. 4; Arunova, "K istorii narodnykh vystupleniI", p. 3l· 
2 Schmidt-Dumont, Turkmenische Herrscher, p. z '9· 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
each of their areas, and thus it was worth their while to defend their 
income from the yield of the tamghä. This example makes it plain that 
every attempt at building an empire, since it required centralisation of 
power and administration, had to work against the owners of the great 
suyiirghäls. A policy of weakening the suyürghäls was in fact adopted 
under the Aq Quyünlii rulers Y a'qüb and A}:imad, and the Safavids too 
regarded the restriction of the suyürghäl system as an important ele-
ment in their internal policy. 
Ya'qiib's vizier, QäzI SafI al-Din 'Isä of Säva, in his attempts to 
restrain the growth of the suyürghäl system, directed his measures 
primarily against the holders of small and medium-sized suyürghäls. lt 
obviously seemed to him too dangerous to embroil himself with the 
great amirs, and he therefore picked on those that had no condition of 
obligatory military service attached to them. Most of these, as we have 
shown above, belonged to religious dignitaries, and thus QäzI 'Isä got 
himself into a paradoxical situation. On the one hand he was basing his 
intentions on the argument that the abolition of the suyürghäls served 
to assure the supremacy of the SharI'a over the Yäsa, and on the other 
'hand he was, on this pretext, actually taking drastic steps against the 
clergy! After this obviously abortive attempt the importance of the 
suyürghäl increased steadily, and it is related of Rustam Aq Quyünlü 
(898-902/1493-1497) that he granted more suyürghäls than any prince 
of the Aq Quyünlü or the Qarä Quyünlü had ever clone before. 1 His 
successor Al;imad Beg Aq Quyünlü, together with his high officials, 
renewed the struggle against the suyürghäl holders, but this time with 
different methods from those used by QäzI 'Isä in his day. He declared 
the provisions of all the "perpetual" suyürghäls granted under his 
predecessors to be invalid. Moreover, he deprived most of the reli-
gious holders of their various privileges, especially that of exemption 
from taxes. lt is clear that this action angered the powerful military 
aristocracy against A}:imad, and after only seven months as ruler he 
died in battle against insurgent amirs (903/1497). 
The Safavids did indeed grant suyürghäls, but their policy in this 
field was clearly different from that of their predecessors. There were 
small and medium-sized suyürghäls throughout the Safavid period, 
and the beneficiaries were generally arbäb-i 'amä'im, i.e. religious dig-
nitaries. There were also cases where suyürghäls were granted not to 
1 Petrushevsky, "K istorii instituta 'soyurgala'", p. 23 r, following the L11bb al-taviirikh. 
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persons but to pious foundations. The mutavalli (administrator) of the 
foundation in question then had the benefit of such a suyürghäl, and 
the whole business was probably a formal artifice to restrict the 
accumulation of prerogative rights in the hands of a single person. 1 In 
addition, various tax Jiabilities were imposed on the suyürghäl holders; 
for example, in the late qth and early 1 8th century the .fadr-i a' tam 
received a percentage of the income from the suyürghäls.2 The 
progressive depreciation of the currency also played its part in weak-
ening the suyürghäls, especially those whose yield had from the start 
been defined as a specific sum of money. 
When the Safavids assumed power the days of the great suyürghäls 
were over. Recalcitrant great landlords were simply deprived of their 
latifundia by degree; other measures were also taken, such as the sus-
pension of suyürghäls in certain provinces (e.g. under 'Abbäs 1 in 
Äzarbäijän).3 In the newly-arisen Safavid state governorships and large 
territories were granted to Qizilbäsh tribes or their leaders, but this 
was now clone in the form not of suyürghäl but of non-hereditary tryiil 
(see below). Naturally - as the course of Safavid history shows - this 
procedure could not prevent the appearance of centrifugal tendencies; 
nevertheless the central power was considerably strengthened by 
avoiding the growth of large suyürghäls, and its organs consciously 
directed their policy towards this end. 
There is one peculiarity we should mention. In some Safavid deeds 
of grant vaqf estates are described as the suyürghäl of their mutavallI. 
This is probably explained by the fact that in those days the functions 
exercised by a mutavalli were in practice identical with those of a 
~äl:tib-suyürghäl; they were entitled to tax revenues, enjoyed immunity 
from taxation, and exercised prerogative rights over their own terri-
tory. Moreover, their position was likewise hereditary, and their ra'äyä 
were bound to the soil. The suyürghäl-holders belonged mainly to the 
religious dass; according to Chardin none but religious families were 
beneficiaries of suyürghäls.4 The contamination of the two types of 
landlordship (taulryat, i.e. administration of foundation property, and 
suyürghäl) is no langer surprising, since the exercise of power was 
identical in both cases, even though their legal bases must be distin-
guished from one another. 
1 Ji!usse, Unters11ch11ngen, p. 99. 2 Minorsky, Tadflkiraf al-M11/iik, pp. 85ff. 
3 Martin, "Seven ~afavid Documents'', pp. zo3, zo5 (document no. 7). 
4 Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, p. 11 j, quoting Chardin v1, 65. 
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Let us now recapitulate the most important characteristics and peculi-
arities of the suyürghäl. lt represented a hereditary grant of land with the 
title to the tax yield (or part of it), immunity from taxation, and 
prerogative rights which, in the case of large suyürghäls, extended to 
administrative and judicial immunity. Further, it can be regarded as 
characteristic that the large suyürghäls of the 1 5th century (Timurids, 
Qarä Quyünlü, Aq Quyünlü) were in the hands of powerful amirs, 
mostly of Türkmen origin, and thus formed the basis of their political 
power. The lords of large suyürghäls were more or less independent 
rulers over their own territories; they were, however, obliged to play an 
active part in the military operations of their sovereign. Restriction of 
the !arge suyürghäls was a precondition for any attempt to centralise the 
state. The small suyürghäls - of rather second-rate importance before 
1 5 oo even though they were widespread - represented the archetype of 
the suyürghäl in the Safavid period. This type of suyürghäl was less 
often connected with services to be rendered; it had rather the character 
of a distinction or honour for special merit. The holders of medium-
sized and small suyürghäls were from the start predominantly 'ulamä; in 
the late Safavid period there were probably hardly any suyürghäls 
granted to persons who did not belong to the religious sphere. 
We can see from this summary that the suyürghäl involved the 
elaboration and fusion of a number of "feudal" institutions that had 
grown up by the middle of the 8th/14th century. In the small 
suyürghäls, especially those of the Safavid type, we can easily recognise 
elements of the muqä~~a. Various types of the Saljüq iqrä' survived in 
all the forms of suyürghäl, and it is evident that the !arge suyürghäl was 
a direct development from the Mongol military iqrä'. The final form of 
the suyürghäl was made possible mainly by the weakness of the central 
power in the successor states to the Il-Khanid empire. There is also the 
very significant fact that the ties between the legal system of that age 
and the SharI'a were relatively loose owing to the considerable inftu-
ence of the Yäsa. This makes it much easier to codify the concept of 
suyürghäl. The suyürghäl had arisen in a period of weak central power, 
and in the 1 5 th century the Timurids, Qarä Quyünlü and Aq Quyünlü 
found it a serious impediment to the development of lasting empires 
with a strong, centrally oriented monarchy. The !arge suyürghäl was 
also one of the bases for the economic and administrative opposition 
between the (military-nomadic) Turkish elements in the population 
and the settled Persian elements. 
po 
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We still have to ask the question whether the suyürghäl was granted 
from state land and, if so, how far one could still speak of "state land" 
with reference to suyürghäls. Again we have to distinguish between 
large and small suyürghäls. The former undoubtedly represented a 
change in the character of divänI land, to which their territories had 
once belonged. With the smaller suyürghäls this was not necessarily 
the case. They were not granted exclusively from state land, but rather 
from vaqf land and - above all in the 17th and 1 8th centuries - from 
crown land. 1 However, at that time it was possible for the ruler to 
encroach directly upon the interests of a governor and his officials by 
making a suyürghäl grant from divänI land. 
One of the most important constituents of the suyürghäl was the 
privilege of fiscal immunity, which in medieval Europe was known as 
exemptio. This privilege had of course been practised lang before the 
collapse of the Il-Khanid state, and in the period with which we are 
concerned it was by no means exclusively connected with a suyürghäl 
grant. We know of many cases where tax exemptions were granted, 
and in practice any tax-paying subject could receive one. Here, in 
connection with the suyürghäl, we intend to deal only with exemptions 
in the agricultural sector. The privilege of tax exemption was in princi-
ple designated by the terms mu'äfi or musallami (pl. musallamryyät). 
Fiscal immunity reached back to pre-Mongol times; under the Il-Khäns 
it was enriched with the qualities of a similar procedure introduced by 
Chingiz Khän. The Mongol privilege of immunity not only had the 
character of a mark of distinction or honour, but was also valid for the 
clergy of any recognised creed, for nobles, and for children. Same 
elements of this Mongol institution were still practised in the following 
centuries. lt thus became the custom to grant exemptions to religious 
personages, and among these not only Muslim but also Christian (es-
pecially Armenian) clerics were included. Vaqf land was also subject to 
exemption. Fiscal immunity for aristocrats (probably mostly nomads) 
or nobles of the state might include a provision - also of Mongol 
origin and still in use under the Timurids - that the person in question 
was, in addition to the mu'äfI, also exempt from criminal prosecution 
for transgressions of the law, the number of offences that might go 
unpunished being precisely defined. Down to the 1 5 th century the 
holder of a hereditary tax exemption for a particular tract of land was 
1 Busse, Untersuchungen, pp. 101-2. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, loc. eil. 
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called tarkhan; the granting of this type of immunity and also the land 
concerned were called tarkhani. Originally tarkhän was a term applied to 
Mongol nobles, but later it was extended to those who, witbout being 
tbemselves members or descendants of tbe Mongol nomad aristocracy, 
nevertbeless enjoyed tbeir privileges, particularly tbe bereditary tax 
exemption of tbeir land. In tbese circumstances tbe tarkbänI represented 
a component tbat bad entered into tbe institution of the suyürgbäl.1 
Tbe recipient of a mu'äfi could be a corporate body as well as an 
individual; as we bave mentioned above, tbe 'ulamä and vaqf estates 
were exempted from taxes. Large mulk estates (see below) often en-
joyed a mu'äfi, and tenant farmers (musta'jir), wbo were liable to pay 
taxes, could likewise be exempted. Tiyüls were also often combined 
with a mu'äfi. In tbe decrees we find, among others, tbe following 
formulae for exemption: mu'af va musallam danand ("to be recognised 
as exempted from liability to pay taxes"), mu'af va musallam va &urr va 
marfü' al-qalam danand ("to be recognised as freed from liability to pay 
taxes, disposing freely [of bis territory] and secured from tbe pen"), 
mu' af va tarkhan va marfii' al-qalam ("exempt from taxes, [ made] tarkbän 
and secured from tbe pen") and mafriir va musta1na shinasand ("to be 
recognised as freed and excepted"). 
Exemptions could be granted en bloc; it was also possible to be 
exempted from individual dues, sometimes only up to a specified 
amount. In all cases more or less exact details were given in tbe decrees. 
Every decree dealing witb a tax exemption was provided wirb a "tax 
list", wbicb indeed often included not only the actual taxes of tbe time 
but also older ones tbat no langer existed; when this list was made up, 
dues from identical (or similar) sources of tax could be grouped to-
getber. Tbis was often clone in order to prevent the tax-collectors from 
using tbe pretext of formal objections, by wbicb tbey migbt possibly 
bave been able to collect tbe dues: tbis migbt be clone merely by tbe 
insertion of previous deeds and by invoking certain cbancery tradi-
tions. The issuing of decrees for fiscal immunity and the registration of 
them was tbe duty of the financial department of tbe divan-i mamalik 
(state land administration) or the divan-i kha![a (crown land administra-
tion). In botb cases tbe procedure generally resulted in tbe execution of 
a deed by tbe sovereign. 
1 Busse, Untersuchungen, pp. 102-3. For exempt Armenian clergy, cf. Papazian, Persidskie doku-
menty I, nos. l-6, 8-10, 14, 18. 
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The tiyül1 is an institution that is in many respects similar to the 
suyürghal. In post-Mongol times this term replaced the word iqtä', and 
various procedures that had developed in the framework of the iqtä' up 
to the early 14th century survived as a rule in the tiyül. Thus tiyül is 
really a later synonym of iqtä', and the historians of the Safavid period 
used "iqtä"' simply as an archaism for "tiyül".2 In the 15th century, 
when the members of the military aristocracy held their great suyür-
ghäls, the tiyüls were used to pay officials, and thus the tiyüls of officers 
of high rank may well have been in many respects similar to the 
medium-sized suyürghäls of the higher religious dignitaries. For the 
sake of simplicity, let us set out the various manifestations of the tiyül 
in the Safavid period. 
The following characteristics apply to all tiyüls: 
(i) The tiyül was in principle subject to a time-limit and therefore 
not devisable; tiyüls were hardly ever recognised as hereditary. 
(ii) The tiyül was always involved with some service to be ren-
dered, either the performance of an office or the obligation to 
raise an army or military units: it therefore represented the usual 
method of payment for this. 
(iii) The fundamental constituent of the tiyül was the grant of the 
tax yield from a particular area or of a part of that yield. 
These are the formal basic elements that had been equally characteristic 
of the earlier iqtä'. We must emphasise the word "formal" in this 
context: the economic, social and political effects of the various forms 
of tiyül were in no way dependent on these three elements, but were 
rather related to the territorial and financial extent of the tiyül in 
question and also to the additional rights granted to the tiyül holder 
(tiJuldär) or claimed by him. The large tiyüls of the Safavid period were 
either "fiefs" of high officials or military "fiefs". As we have already 
said, under the Safavids the members of the military aristocracy were 
now granted their extensive territories as tiyül and no longer as 
suyürghäl. This was the case with governors (päkim, pl. pukkäm), with 
Qizilbäsh nobles who occupied official posts, and with other military 
dignitaries, who were above all expected to raise troops. lt is beyond 
doubt that the reason for avoiding suyürghäl grants in such cases was 
t TMEN n, 667 ff. (no. 1014). 
2 Lambton, Landlord a11d Peasa11t, pp. rnz, 109ff. Minorsky, Ta{ffikirat a/-M11/iik, pp. z8ff. 
Kaempfer, p. 96. 
513 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
the intention to restrict, at least formally, the autonomy of the high 
amirs in the provinces. The fact that henceforward military functionar-
ies (like the officials) were paid by tiyül" may also reflect the Safavids' 
endeavour to assimilate the predominantly Turkish military aristocracy 
to the higher bureaucracy, which was mostly of Persian origin. The 
exercise of rights of lordship by the great tiyüldärs was not noticeably 
different from the practice of the great ~äl;iib-suyürghäls of the pre-
Safavid era. This type of tiyüldär had absolute power over the land and 
its inhabitants, treated the peasants as he pleased and was assured of the 
non-intervention of the officials. In the time of Chardin, who travelled 
to Iran three times between 165 5 and 1677, there were a number of 
tiyüls that had de facto become hereditary, so that the distinction be-
tween tiyül and the earlier suyürghäl was becoming blurred. Chardin 
also reported that the inhabitants of tiyüls that were in practice hered-
itary enjoyed better treatment than those of non-hereditary "fiefs".1 
This is easily understandable: the tiyüldär with a time limit was obvi-
ously very much interested in extracting the highest possible profits 
from his "fief". F or the holders of intermediate and higher offices there 
were tiyüls attached to the office, so that on a new appointment to a 
post there was also a new grant of the tiyül. This arrangement corre-
sponded largely to the Ottoman khäf!. Chardin's observation held 
good, and to an even higher degree, for the peasants of such "fiefs". 
However, it often happened that "special" salary contracts were con-
cluded with new office-holders, which meant that they were granted 
additional tiyüls (probably only for life). In ·any case it held good for all 
these tiyüldärs that the competence of the organs of the state land 
administration extended to them only to a limited degree. The payment 
of ordinary officials and holders of minor military rank was likewise 
effected by procedures similar to tiyüls, but special forms had devel-
oped for this sector. An essential criterion for the significance of the 
small tiyül with regard to landholding was whether the salary of the 
person concerned was assigned as global tiyül for a village or at least 
part of a village, or whether this tiyül was restricted to a specified 
(larger or smaller) sum of money - often with i.ndication of the tax 
source. In the former case it could be assumed that the tiyül holder had 
certain rights of exploitation over the ra'äyä. If, however, the tiyül 
consisted only of relatively small individual sums, then the recipient of 
1 Chardin v, 418-zo. 
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the salary was hardly in a position to influence production within the 
area of his "fief". In this context it is also an important question 
whether the tiyuldär had the tax yield (i.e. the income from his "fief") 
collected by persons subordinate to him, or whether this was effected 
by tax officials. (With governorships both definitions applied: the offic-
ials were subordinates of the l_i.äkim.) The answer to this question tells 
us a great deal about the degree of power that the tiyü.ldärs possessed in 
their territories. lt is evident that those paid by way of partial tiyuls 
stood lowest in the hierarchy of the tiyü.ldärs. For them there were two 
main methods of payment: either a specified sum of money was 
awarded from a particular source and they could claim it every year, or 
the salary was reassigned annually on production of a certificate of 
employment. In both cases - and this also held good for somewhat 
more lucrative tiyü.l grants - the central financial administration issued 
a tax-cheque (barät) for the stipulated sum, to be collected from the 
relevant tax district; the recipient had to cash this cheque on the spot, 
and for this reason the category of barät recipients was often contrasted 
with the possessors of (large) tiyü.ls. In the former case, this assignment 
of tax money (~aväla) was effected automatically, so long as there was 
no decree ordering a different procedure; a standing assignment of this 
kind was called hama-säla. Most of the baräts were probably issued 
through the hama-säla procedure. There was also a rather less common 
procedure called yak-säla, which we mentioned earlier on in our dis-
cussion of the idrär: in this case the assignment was renewed every 
year.1 Salaries assigned by barät were called maviijib (i.e. dues, income). 
These maväjib were in practice usually a little less than the nominal 
value of the barät. The salary of a subordinate recipient was often 
issued in the form of several small assignments of different types, with 
the further complication that the localities assigned for payment were 
often so far away from the recipient that he could not possibly make 
the journey because of the expense and waste of time. This led to the 
development of a special source of profit. Persons well provided with 
capital bought up the issued tax-cheques for less than their nominal 
1 From Minorsky, Tad!J.kirat al-Muliik, p. 29, it is evident that payment of tiyüls was effected 
through the barät system and that hama-säla and yak-säla were special cases of barät. 
Consequently the concept of tiyül applied to governors, officials of high or low rank and all 
subordinates in receipt of salaries, in so far as their salaries were in the form of assignments. lt is 
therefore not altogether correct, in our view, to regard tiyül, barät and hama-säla as procedures 
that differed basically from one another. Cf. Kaempfer, p. 96; Schuster-Walser, Das fllfawidische 
Persien, p. 3 8. 
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value and then, either personally or through representatives, collected 
the full amounts on the spot. This procedure was employed especially 
with soldiers. t The Qizilbäsh warriors of the rnth/ r 6th century still 
largely participated in the "fiefs" of their tribe ( or in fact those of the 
tribal leader), in much the same way as with the military iqtä' of the 
Mongols. Later they were more and more paid individually, naturally 
by way of assignments. The ghulämän - the royal special troops since 
the time of 'Abbäs I - were, however, paid in cash.2 
We see that certain types of landholding survived in the Safavid 
tiyül. Thus elements of the idrär and the muqä~~a can easily be recog-
nised in the general salary system; the large tiyüls continued the tradi-
tion of the large suyürghäls of the 9th/15th century, though they also 
showed some features of the Mongol tribal "fief". The replacement of 
suyürghäl domination of the pre-Safavid type by tiyül "fiefs" did not, 
in the long run, bring about any large-scale weakening of the great 
land-holders. The attempt to strengthen the powers of the central 
authority by the expansion of crown land was probably more success-
ful; we shall say more about this later. 
Different kinds of grants of tax revenue were subsumed, by formal 
criteria, into the concept of tiyül. This led in the end to a confusion 
of concepts. Tiyül, on the one hand, was used to convey the idea of 
grants in general, but also had the special sense of major "fiefs" 
which might have unmistakable suyürghäl character. On the other 
hand, the term suyürghäl had become rarer in the later Safavid 
period; it was used mainly for hereditary beneficia of distinguished 
and generally religious families. Clearly there was at no time any eff-
ort to define and codify, and eventually there was a certain confusion 
of the two ideas. 
In conclusion we should mention that the holders of tiyüls in the 
later Safavid period had to pay dues for their "fiefs". The smallest 
amounts were paid for tiyüls connected with military service; with 
these the total dues came to about 3!%. More than 10% was collected 
for a hama-säla, and more than 16% for a major tiyül. Holders of 
suyürghäls had to pay nearly a quarter of the revenue. 3 
The next category to be discussed is that of the mulk (pl. amläk) 
1 Schuster"Walser, Das fafawidiscbe Persien, p. 34, guoting Kaempfer, p. 75. 
2 Schuster-Walser, ibid„ pp. 301f„ following mainly Della Valle and Thevenot. 
3 Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, pp. 124-6, quoting Tad!Jkirat ai-Muiük, PP· 85-93. 
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estates. Mulk was understood as unconditional possession ofland. The 
owner (miilik) could do what he liked with his land and was free to sell 
it or transfer it to other persons; it was devisable, mostly in accordance 
with the relevant Islamic rules, and there were no services of any kind 
attached to the possession of it. At the same time the concept of mulk 
included the ownership of irrigation works on the land in question and 
the water itself. There were precise legal regulations governing the 
conditions on which land could become mulk, but the practice of 
earlier centuries had already deviated from the rules. The essential 
characteristic of mulk land was that the features mentioned above 
(devisability, vendibility) were attached to the land itself, so lang as no 
action had been taken to divest it of its mulk character. This also 
applied when there were various privileges connected with the mulk. 
An ordinary mulk was of course liable to tax: the normal d:ivän taxes 
for mulk land were one-tenth of the revenue. On the other hand, an 
estate of the mulk-i ~urr dass gave its owner, to some extent automati-
cally, the advantage of exemption from taxes. The tax officials carried 
mulk land of this type in their books as isqiit (approximately 
"dropped out", i.e. from tax liability). Land of the mulk-i l_lurr type 
could therefore be sold for a considerably higher price than normal 
mulk land of equivalent value. lt might of course also happen that the 
owner himself, the mälik, was granted an exemption (mu'äfi) from 
taxes. However, in this case it was a matter of a strictly personal 
exemption which, understandably, could not be transferred by sale to 
other persons together with mulk land, even when the mu'äfi was 
hereditary. 
We can distinguish two different types of mulk land. On large mulk 
estates the soil was cultivated by the local ra'äyä, and the relations 
between mälik and peasantry had a rather patriarchal character. Here 
the mälik was the beneficiary of his share in the yield. There was also, 
however, small-scale mulk land cultivated by the mälik himself, though 
this form of mulk was very much on the decline. Conquests and 
frequent changes of sovereign were a danger to the continued existence 
of mulk land, as it was always doubtful whether the mulk character of 
any piece of land would still be recognised under the new ruler. As we 
have already said, large amläk were often converted into suyürghäls. 
This made no difference to the actual circumstances within the land 
concerned; it did, however, mean the legal cancellation of its mulk 
status. Evidently the small mälik, in such situations, was particularly at 
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the mercy of inßuential and powerful personages. lt is therefore hardly 
possible to prove the existence of small amläk in the Timurid period or 
later. In the Il-Khanid period very large amläk came into being 
through sales and purchases. After the collapse of this dynasty the 
number of large amläk increased rapidly, as many persons with the 
power to do so possessed themselves of Il-Khanid crown estates 
and ultimately incorporated them into their own property. At that 
time it was still possible to acquire large mulk property by purchase, 
as is shown by the increase in the amount of land owned by the 
early Safavids in the environs of Ardabil (e.g. under Shaikh Sadr 
al-Din).1 Subsequently the number of amläk decreased. After the Sa-
favids had taken over, many amläk were confiscated in the course of 
efforts to ensure a concentration of power. A further decline of the 
amläk was occasioned by the creation of crown land (khä$$a) under 
'Abbäs I and probably even later; the shah forced the mulk owners to 
sell him their land at a low price, which almost amounted to confisca-
tion.2 
One special form of landholding was in many respects comparable 
with the mulk; this was the khali1a, an institution of Il-Khanid origin. 
lt was understood in the 8th/14th century tobe devastated and unculti-
vated (thus usually unirrigated) territory, forming part of either state 
land or crown land, which was given the advantages of a mulk (tithe, 
vendibility, etc.) for a limited period; in these circumstances the person 
who undertook the task of irrigating and cultivating the land was 
declared to be its landlord. Such a person was called tani (pl. tunna', 
"resident").3 This measure to repair the ravages inßicted on agriculture 
by the Mongol conquest was obviously a thoroughly practical one. 
There may still have been khäli$a land in this sense under the Timurids. 
Later, however, this expression denoted a particular type of crown 
land (see below). We may perhaps see in this a hint of the future fate of 
land affected by this institution. 
We hardly need to explain here the fundamental principles of the 
pious foundations (vaqf, pl. auqäf). We will merely remind the reader 
of a few important points. Anyone who possessed profitable movable 
1 Petrushevsky, Kisbävarzi II, 79, quoting Manäqib-i Sbaikh .)afi al-Din Ardabili. 
2 Falsafi, Zindagäni III, 27off. For the decline of the "arbäbI" (i.e. mulk) estates, cf. Du Mans, 
p. 226; for conliscation, cf. also Kaempfer, p. 95. 
3 Petrushevsky, Kisbävarzi II, 2 5, and in CHI v, j26. Obviously ·the arrangements for khäli~a 
estates differed from one patt of the country to another. 
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or immovable property could, by fulfilling certain conditions, donate 
this for charitable or religious purposes. Suitable recipients for dona-
tions were mosques, the graves of holy men, khänqähs (hospices for 
dervishes), institutions of general importance such as schools, caravan-
sarais, bridges and wells, and also groups of persons, for example the 
donor's family or his descendants. In the latter case, the usual descrip-
tion was vaqf-i ahli. Even fictitious persons could be made the recipi-
ents of a donation: 'Abbäs 1 in 1015/1606-7 converted his private 
property into vaqf for the "Fourteen Immaculate Ones" (Mu}:iammad, 
Fätima and the Twelve lmäms). We shall return to this subject in a 
different context. In Persia there were also many auqäf for Christian 
(generally Armenian) institutions, especially under the later Safavids. 1 
Here we shall deal mainly with donations of estates. 
The donor appointed an administrator (mutavallI) for his vaqf. This 
office was normally hereditary and an annual stipend was assigned to 
its holder from the endowment. In general, foundations enjoyed a 
mu'äfi (exemption) from ordinary and special taxes. In the 8th/14th 
century the auqäf were controlled by the Islamic judges (qär/i, pl. qutfät) 
of the regions in question; for technical reasons special authorities 
were ultimately set up to deal with them. In the Safavid state - and 
even earlier - the control and administration of the auqäf, besides the 
safeguarding of the interests of Islamic law, were among the main 
duties of the fadr, who was head of the divän al-fadära and to whom 
provincial ~adrs were subordinated. The competent authority for the 
financial administration of the auqäf was the mustaufi-yi mauqiifät (finan-
cial controller of foundations), who was head of an office for endow-
ment affairs (daftar-i mauqiifät). Chardin described this mustaufi as a 
"lieutenant des ~adr".2 Sadr authorities and mutavallis ensured the 
fulfilment of the various purposes of the foundations; in addition they 
were themselves beneficiaries of the production from vaqf land and 
controlled the use of it. This does not mean that the mutavallI himself 
might have been a member of the ~adr authorities: the situation 
was rather that the mutavallI exercised his hereditary office like a 
1 See, e.g„ Papazian, Persidskie Doiellmenry r, nos. 2, 4 (both pre-Safavid), Io, II, I2, q, 19; n, 
nos. 4, 14, 25, 26, 38. There are also Christian auqäf in the Lebanon. 
2 Minorsky, Tad/Jkirat al-Muliik, p. I46. Chardin vr, 6 I. Lambton, Landlord and Peasanl, p. I 20. 
Petrushevsky, Kishävarzi 11, 29, states that the fadr al-fudiir was already the head of the divän-i 
mauqiifät in the Il-Khanid period. According to Roemer, Staatsschreiben, pp. I43-5, however, there 
is no evidence for the office of ~adr until the I 5th century, and at the end of the Il-Khanid period 
endowment affairs were the responsibility of the l;äkim-i auqäf-i mamälik-i mal;riisa. 
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landlord. Dismissal of a mutavallI was usually not within the powers of 
the representatives of the ~adr authorities and the judges subordinated 
to them. The divän al-~adära and especially the daftar-i mauqüfüt were 
merely the competent authorities for the affairs of the mutavallI and bis 
vaqf property. The extent of the autonomy of the landlord in the later 
Safavid period is clearly illustrated by the fact (already mentioned in 
our discussion of the suyürghäl) that in some deeds of grant the vaqf 
estates of a mutavallI are spoken of as his suyürghäl. Obviously the 
mutavallI's exercise of power over the land entrusted to him differed 
only very little from that of a ~äl:;ib-suyürghäl. We must, however, bear 
in mind that at this time even the ~äl:;ib-suyürghäl was a religious 
dignitary. 
Vaqf land could not be converted into another category of land and 
could, therefore, not be sold. In theory it could also not be confiscated, 
but in reality this was not always the case. Many auqäf bad in fact been 
confiscated in the Mongol period, and even in later times, under the 
Safavids, it often happened that foundation land was removed from the 
competence of the divän al-~adära. Nevertheless the landowner could 
largely keep himself out of tbe reacb of tbe organs of tbe state and tbe 
ruler by converting bis estates into auqäf and appointing himself (and 
his descendants) as mutavallI. 
lt was probably the theoretical impossibility of selling vaqf estates 
tbat caused tbe development of a special form of land tenancy; vaqf 
property was assigned to tenants (musta'jir) for a period of 99 years, in 
most cases probably in return for a lump sum. Wben tbis period bad 
elapsed these tenants bad to pay a sum equal to one year's tax yield of 
the area in question, whereupon the land was assigned to them for 
another 99 years. In some cases, however, a relatively small sum was 
collected annually as rent; tbe actual amount was determined by the 
size of tbe rented land. 
The office of mutavallI appears, at any rate in some cases, to have 
been very profitable, especially witb foundations for the great ShI'I 
holy places in Iran. 'Abbäs II tried to counteract the concentration of 
administration of large vaqf estates in the hands of a few people by 
once again dividing up the estates among the mutavallis.1 lt hardly 
made any difference to the ra'äyä whether they lived on a "fief" from 
divänI land or on vaqf land. In some places there may have been some 
t Busse, Untersuch11ngen, p. 116, quoting Chardin VI, 6 3. 
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arrangements by which the mutavallI's or the musta'jir's share in the 
harvest was fixed as a lump sum. In consequence of the continual 
devaluation of the currency, however, it was in the landlord's interests 
to secure a definite percentage share of the harvest. Ultimately this way 
of determining the share was in general use, as we see in a farman dated 
RabI' II 1073/November-December 1662.1 
One particular institution dates back to the time of Tahmasp 1, 
namely the foundations for the "Fourteen Immaculate Ones" (see 
above); the reigning sovereign of the time was appointed as their 
mutavallI. The best known of these foundations is the one which, as we 
have already mentioned, arose from the conversion of the private 
estates of 'Abbas 1 (1015/1606-7). Such foundation property from 
crown land, with the sovereign himself as mutavallI, was called auqäf -i 
tafvizi (tafviz, "mandate", "authorisation"). Simultaneously with this 
extensive increase in crown foundations the office of ~adr was divided: 
a ~adr-i khä~~a (~adr for crown foundations) was set up side by side 
with a fadr-i 'ämma (~adr for general foundations). However, the situa-
tion was not exactly that the competence of the ~adr-i kha~~a was 
confined to regions in which there were foundations created by the 
sovereign from crown land; he was also competent for some other 
(defined) territories, and the ~adr-i 'amma was also often concerned 
with crown foundations. At certain times the two ~adr offices were 
united in a single person.2 
To sum up: it appears that in the sphere of the foundation system 
there was also a marked tendency to develop a fairly uniform type of 
landholding, of a kind that we have already seen in the tiyül and the 
suyürghäl. The growth of the crown foundations and the creation of 
the office of ~adr-i kha~~a may be an indication that the Safavid central 
power was adjusting its policy, even with regard to the foundation 
system, so as to restrict the influence of these landlords. 
Finally we have to consider the category of crown lands. The exis-
tence of estates of which the income was directly at the disposal of the 
court and especially the sovereign was not in itself anything new. As 
far back as the 11-Khanid period extensive areas, including whole 
towns, had been converted into crown property, and for these the 
1 Printed in Lambton, Landlord and Peasanl, pp. 113-14, with commentary. 
2 Tar!fl.kira/ al-Muliik, p. 42 (and Minorsky's comments at p. 111 ). The division of the oflice of 
~adr is mentioned by Kaempfer, p. 98. 
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Mongol term i'!}ii or the Arabo-Persian ( amläk-i) khäffa was used. 
After the collapse of the Il-Khanid empire there was a marked de-
crease in the extent of khä~~a land. The weakening of the central power 
in all regions of the former empire led to the conversion of large parts 
of earlier crown land into divänI or mulk land. lt is clear, however, that 
even the post-Mongol dynasties bad control of areas whose tax rev-
enues were at the disposal of the sovereign and his nearest relatives and 
also the court. 
W e cannot take the formal distinction between crown land and state 
land to imply any opposition between the court and the state adminis-
tration. In the 9th/15th and 10th/16th centuries crown estates were 
characterised by the fact that (at least in theory) sovereignty over them 
was not assigned to influential personages in the form of suyürghäls or 
large tiyüls, as was the case with divänI land. They therefore not only 
served to finance the sovereign's personal expenditure but also formed 
a counterpoise against those tendencies towards feudal splintering of 
the land that we have seen with other categories of land. From this it is 
apparent that the strengthening of the monarchy and the central power 
under the Safavids was accompanied by growth in the size and import-
ance of crown estates. Strictly speaking, even before 'Abbäs 1 the 
crown estates were not free from "fiefs" of various kinds. However, 
the holders of these "fiefs" were very close relatives of the sovereign, 
and this was in complete accordance with the traditional character of 
the crown estates. These had become very substantial in the 10th/16th 
century; they included a number of more or less centrally situated 
provinces and formed a contrast to the governorships that had been 
bestowed as tiyül, for example on the Qizilbäsh leaders. Such 
provinces which were entirely crown property were called khä~~a. 
Smaller crown estates, situated within other governorships, at that 
time generally bore the name of khälifät (literally "free", i.e. from 
interference by the governor); these crown estates must not be 
confused with the 8th/14th century institutions that were also called 
khäli~ät (see above). 
The sweeping internal reforms of'Abbäs 1 (centralisation, repression 
of the Qizilbäsh, establishment of the ghulämän-i khäff) and the increas-
ing requirements of the court were among the causes of accelerating 
growth of crown estates under this ruler. This extension occurred in 
various ways. For example, a complaint from the inhabitants of a 
village near Naranz about the arbitrary attitude of the tax officials 
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served the shah as a pretext for incorporating the whole district of 
Natanz into the crown lands.1 Sometimes too the shah bought up 
private mulk estates: when this happened, the persons affected - as we 
have already mentioned - had to put up with a low price. Often the 
possessions or "fiefs" of dignitaries who had fallen into disgrace (for. 
example Qizilbäsh leaders) were confiscated for the crown estates. In 
the end I~fahän, Käshän, parts of Kirmän and Y azd, Qazvin, Qum, 
Gilän and Mäzandarän all belonged to the sovereign's domains. The 
political aim of the extension of crown property was above all to break 
the power of the Qizilbäsh leaders, who ever since the beginnings of 
Safavid rule had been holding the governorships as tiyul. As soon as a 
province was turned into khä~~a it also became free of Qizilbäsh troops 
as there was no langer any governor. This policy was continued under 
Shah Safl and 'Abbäs II. Safi's vizier, Säru TaqI, was one of its most 
important proponents, and it was he who instigated the incorporation 
of Färs into the crown lands. The crown estates attained their greatest 
extent under 'Abbäs II, but decreased again thereafter, as the threat of 
war once more necessitated the appointment of (Qizilbäsh) governors 
and these were naturally expected to raise troops. 
A special administrative machinery for the crown estates had been 
built up and developed since the time of 'Abbäs 1. Viziers were put at 
the head of the khä~~a provinces. The various administrative affairs 
came gradually within the competence of the crown land administra-
tion (sarkär-i kha![a-yi sharifa).2 As we have noticed above, there had 
been a ~adr for the crown estates since the time of 'Abbäs I, and now in 
addition a chancellery for the administration of crown property was 
established, with standing equivalent to that of the state chancel-
lery. In the crown estates the Qizilbäsh were replaced by the troops of 
the ghulämän-i khä~~- The maintenance and payment of these forces 
made it necessary to depart from the previous practice of paying court 
and crown servants in cash. From 1026-7/1617-8 onwards the pay-
ment of all persons in the service of the domains administration was 
effected in the usual manner: officials and troops received tiyuls in the 
same way as others of their kind, or else barät (hama-säla and other 
maväjib assignments) from the tax revenues of crown estates.3 In the 
1 FalsafI, Zindagänim, 27>. 2 Minorsky, TadfJkirat al-M11/iik, pp. 2jff. 
3 Röhrborn, Provinzen 1111d Zentralge111alt, p. 1 3 3, quoting Iskandar MunshI. 
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late Safavid period the "fiefs and appanages" part of the crown 
property grew to such an extent that it seemed advisable to bring 
together, as a new organisational group, the remaining crown estates 
from which neither tiyüls were assigned nor salaries allocated; the term 
khäli~a found further employment as the name for this type of crown 
land. 
lt is indisputable that 'Abbäs I and his successors, by their policy of 
extending the crown estates, achieved their object of a political and 
economic weakening of the Qizilbäsh tribes and their leaders. They 
were unable, nevertheless, to prevent the crown land from immediately 
developing forms of ownership similar to those that had existed pre-
viously in the other areas. In the end it made hardly any difference to 
the simple peasants whether their landlord was a tiyüldär on state or 
crown land. Moreover their situation was scarcely affected by the ques-
tion whether their landlord exercised his absolute authority over them 
by reason of a tiyül, a suyürghäl, or an appointment as mutavallI. The 
peasants were perhaps more oppressed on the khäli~a estates, where 
they were the victims of arbitrary treatment by the tax officials, than on 
tiyül land or in areas that were used as beneficia for certain officials and 
dignitaries. 
THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE CITIES: COMMERCE AND TRADE 
In the Saljüq period Iranian foreign trade still extended far beyond the 
frontiers of the Islamic world. The Mongol conquest dealt a severe 
blow to this trade; nonetheless at the beginning of the 8th/ 14th century 
the big trading cities of Iran again appear as commercial links between 
east and west. This astonishingly rapid regeneration may well be con-
nected with the fact that under the rule of the Chingizids Iran was 
brought politically closer to the countries of Central and Eastern Asia 
and, in consequence, served as a gateway to Europe for the traders of 
the entire Mongol empire - and vice versa. Moreover, as a result of the 
downfall of the 'Abbasid Caliphate, Iran's commercial activities had 
found a new focus: it is true that Baghdad continued to be an economi-
cally important city, but in the 8th/14th century Tabriz, the seat of the 
ll-Khäns, had taken precedence over all other cities in Iran. The 
ravages of the Mongol invasion, which had set other cities far back 
from their former stage of development, had long since been repaired 
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in Tabriz. In spite of the rapid reconstruction of the basic structures of 
Iranian economic life, however, the economic flowering which had 
been a characteristic of every large city in the land in the pre-Mongol 
period could not be achieved again. 
At this point we should recall how enormously important for orien-
tal foreign trade in all ages was the maintenance of the trade-routes. 
Commercial development depended in a high degree upon the quality 
and safety of the roads, the density of the communications network, 
the number of well appointed halting-places, watering-places, bridges, 
etc. The degree of development enjoyed by the cities was related ulti-
mately to these factors also. For the city was above all a place of trade 
and exchange; its economic heart had always been the bazaars, the 
store-houses, the counting-houses; it was a vital necessity for the city 
to be attached to a supra-regional communications-network. 
From this point of view the existence of well-organised, centralised 
states with the widest possible area of dominion was highly advantage-
ous to the intensi6cation of Iranian internal trade. The administrative 
organs of such a state-structure were much better able than an often 
shortlived, unstable local polity would have been to guarantee the 
quality, safety, and numerical sufficiency of the elements required by 
the economic infrastructure. For this very reason even trivial political 
changes frequently exercised an effect upon commercial life. 
We have already referred to the importance of Tabriz under the 
Mongols. From this city the main trade raute led diagonally across 
northern Iran to the east, following the traditional silk-route, through 
Khuräsän to Samarqand and eventually to China. Commercial traffic 
from the interior of the Iranian highlands and from the south did 
not lead directly into Tabriz, but through several entrepots lying 
along this west - east raute: Sultäniyya, Qazvin, Ray and Nishäpür. 
As Sultäniyya had become the seat of .the Il-Khäns, it overshadowed 
the other centres. Since the supersession of the port of Siräf an the 
Persian Gulf by Hurmuz, through which the whole sea traffic 
between India and the Levant immediately began to flow, the trade-
route between Sultäniyya and Hurmuz not only represented the north 
- south axis of internal Iranian trade, but made Iran the point of 
intersection of all existing trade links by land and sea between Europe 
and Asia in the 8th/14th century. The collapse of the 11-Khanid 
empire ushered in a gradual decline in the importance of Iran in the 
passage of trade between Europe and the Far East. The interest of the 
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Timurids was directed more at promoting the eastern Iranian trade 
centres such as Samarqand and Herat than at developing Iran's tradi-
tional position as the prime link in the chain of east-west trade. As 
a result of the opening up of the sea route to India round the 
southern cape of Africa, the importance of Iran for world trade 
rapidly declined, and constant military confrontations between the 
Timurids and the Türkmen states in the west, and the labile internal 
conditions of all these states created obstacles in the way of politico-
economic concepts and considerations on a grand, supra-regional 
scale. When at last the country was consolidated under the Safavids, 
and the internal preconditions for the commercial recuperation of 
Iran were restored, it was already too late: world trade was now run-
ning along new tracks. As a result of the increasing importance of 
European commercial shipping in inter-continental trade, Iran found 
itself pushed onto the fringe of the world economic scene. lt could no 
longer pride itself on playing an active part in world transit trade. To 
the European commercial powers Iran remained of interest chiefly on 
account of its products and raw materials. The economic flowering of 
I~fahän in the nth/17th century is to be traced chiefly to this city's 
pre-eminence in internal trade. The capital of the Safavid period can-
not, therefore, be compared with Tabriz of the Mongol period, when 
it was a centre for international commerce. 
A special mark of the merchant dass, from the 8th/ 14th century 
onwards, was their close association with the great landowners. We 
have already mentioned the fact that the incumbents of suyürghäls, the 
usufructuaries of vaqf land (mutavallis, etc.) and the owners of mulk 
land preferred, unlike their antecedents in the early Islamic period, to 
live far away from their lands in the cities, where they were numbered 
amongst the most prominent citizens. Their large incomes enabled 
them to take part in a variety of commercial enterprises; they did this 
partly through capital investment, and partly by consigning large 
quantities of agricultural products to merchant-princes in exchange for 
a share in their profits. The preconditions for this were present, for 
ever since the Mongol domination the dues of the ra'äya had increas-
ingly come to be paid in kind. For their part the landowners invested a 
great deal of the wealth that they did not require for their own use in 
commercial enterprises. Even the rulers did not hesitate at times to 
invest considerable sums out of the privy purse in the businesses of 
commercial magnates. That this phenomenon is characteristic of the 
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big business of that time can be seen from the name given to the 
merchant-prince, urtäq (Turkish ortaq, "partner", "shareholder").1 
In the 1 1th/1 7th century foreign trade experienced a sharp increase in 
the volume of government commissions: the monopolisation by the 
crown of the silk trade, as well as of the production of precious stones 
and of other branches of industry, created the preconditions for this 
increase.2 Under 'Abbäs I there was a tremendous opening up of caravan 
routes and the provision everywhere of installations (inns, etc.) to serve 
the needs of commercial traffic. One of the most spectacular of these 
installations was the so-called sang-farsh, about 30 kilometres of paved 
roadway with several bridges across a swampy salt desert between 
Ardistän and Firüzküh.3 At a single strake this road-system, built in a 
very short time, made I~fahän the centre of Iranian internal trade. As a 
result of these measures the whole commerce of the country naturally 
experienced an upsurge, but these efforts to extend and improve the 
communications network in Iran must also be assessed in terms of the 
commercial interests of the shah. At that time he was probably the 
biggest merchant-prince in the land; in the course of the 11th/17th 
century,: under imperial protection, Armenians and European compa-
nies became the carriers of almost the entire export. Evidently the native 
merchants could only partially adapt to the mercantile requirements of 
the times and concentrated more on home markets, although even in the 
late 11th/17th century individual merchants were still keeping up com-
mercial contacts with distant countries.4 
In the centuries now under discussion, commerce in Iran was con-
ducted solely in cash, with the clumsiness that this entailed. Money was 
packed in leather sacks in lots of 50 (silver) tümäns and transported in 
the merchant caravans. The beginnings of non-cash transactions, 
which had evolved in the pre-Mongol period, seem to have been 
forgotten. In the second half of the 11th/17th century the Iranian 
commercial system made a rather poor impression on several European 
travellers. At that time the road network was becoming increasingly 
neglected, and the tradition-bound merchants of Iran were indeed 
1 Minorsky and Minovi, "Na~ir al-Din Tiisi on finance", p. 84. Petrushevsky, in CHI v, 509. 
Hinz, "Ein orientalisches Handelsunternehmen", p. 334. 
2 Minorsky, Ta4!;kiral al-Muliik, p. 20. Kaempfer, p. 94. 
3 A. Gabriel, Die Erforschung Persiens (Vienna, 1952), pp. 71, 85, quoting Della Valle and 
Thomas Herbert. Siroux, Caravansirails, p. 19. Tehrani, Die EnhtJicklung, pp. 13ff. 
4 Chardin IV, 167. 
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becoming less and less fit to stand up to the constantly increasing 
rivalry of European world trade.1 
And yet the native merchants were well-off. Every year they made a 
profit of 30-40% on their business capital. In the warehouse of a 
merchant of I~fahän were found, during the Afghan siege of 
l l 3 5/1722, silver coins worth l,792 tümäns (on the value of the tümän 
see below.) This gives us some idea of the size of cash hoard a 
merchant-prince could command.2 
Under the later Safavids export concentrated on the same products 
as those for which Iran had already become famous in the Mongol 
period: fabrics of all kinds, brocades, camel-hair, tobacco, precious 
stones, and, above all, silk; while during the Safavid era also the 
export of carpets steadily rose.3 By contrast the supply of precious 
metals seems to have been more or less exhausted in this period. At 
no time, however, did the export of silver, mostly in coin and princi-
pally to India, ever cease. Those chiefly responsible for this export 
were the usurious Indian money-changers and money-lenders, who in 
the 1 l th/ 17th century plied their trade in every important centre 
of commerce. In I~fahän alone there are supposed to have been 
lo,ooo of them. Their profit margin was allegedly much greater than 
that of the native merchants.4 At all events they contributed to the 
universal shortage of money, which was aggravated also by the finan-
cial policy of the court, for in the later Safavid state cash payment was 
avoided and as much coin as possible hoarded in the treasury of the 
ruler.5 
Inter-city trade was profitable only for commercial magnates with 
!arge capital, who were in a position to deal in costly luxury goods, and 
had the necessary trade connections and possibly also their own special 
organisations. The small merchant, who did not have these means, was 
basically restricted to trading in utility goods, chiefly in the produce 
from the countryside around his own city. High domestic tolls pre-
vented him from undertaking lengthy overland transport: because of 
1 Minorsky, Tfl{f/Jkirat al-M11/iik, pp. 10, 180. Chardin IV, 170. Rabino, "Banking in Persia", 
pp. 11ff. Ashraf, p. 311. 
2 Minorsky, T fl{f/Jkirat al-M11/iik, pp. 19ff., quoting the Z11bdat a/-taväri/eh. 
3 Chardin IV, 1621f. Petrushevsky, in CHI v, 508. 
4 Chardin IV, 64. Kaempfer, pp. 160, 178. Minorsky, Tfl{f/Jkirat al-M11ltik, p. 19. 
5 Chardin v, 430. Kaempfer, p. 96. Du Mans, p. 193. Schuster-Walser, Das 1afa111idische Persien, 
p. 39. Minorsky, Tar!!J.kirat al-M.Nliik, pp. 181ff. Rabino, Coins, Met/als and Seals, p. 6. 
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the variations in maximum prices from place to place, it was question-
able whether he would make a profit. 
Artisans, small merchants and other tradesmen - people who offered 
any kind of service - were organised in guilds (finf, pl. afnäf). 
Everything Petrushevsky has said in the previous volume about these 
guilds in the 8th/14th century applies to the following period.1 We do, 
however, have some additional information about these organisations 
as they existed under the Safavids. From the ranks of the "masters" 
(ustäd) they elected representatives (kadkhudä, a term applied also to the 
head of a city-district), who in turn had to be accredited by an official 
called a naqib (presumably the head of the sayyids of the city). Only 
then could the representative be officially installed by the kaläntar. The 
kaläntar was an official with functions similar to those of a western 
European mayor; but he was appointed by the central government and 
normally belonged to the aristocracy of his city. The office was often 
hereditary, and in the 8th/14th century the kaläntar still bore the title 
ra'is. This great interest of the government in the guilds can best be 
explained by the part they played in the assessment of taxes on profits 
and of corvees (cf. below, the discussion of the tax-system). In other 
respects the competence of the heads of the guilds was rather limited. 
No one was permitted to open a new shop without their permission; 
and in addition it was their duty to present the monthly schedules for 
fixing the maximum prices to the fäpib-nasaq, an official whose principal 
concern was with price control and related problems. This official was 
responsible to the muptasib al-mamälik ("overseer of market and morals 
for the whole realm"), who was represented in each city by the ni!Jib 
(literally "deputy"). Final decisions were made within the framework 
of this authority, so that the elders of the guilds exerted only an 
indirect influence on the price structure. Within the first three months 
of the tax-year the members of the guilds (most likely only the masters) 
assembled at the offices of the naqib or before the kaläntar in order to 
discuss the apportionment of the prescribed dues.2 There is no mention 
of any other "guild meetings". Chardin reports categorically that they 
never took place.3 For the rest, the guilds were very loosely organised, 
but they did attend to the mutual support of their members, if these 
should become needy, and provided a not very binding instrument to 
t Petrushevsky, in CHI v, jo9, 5111f. On the röle of the a~näf in Safavid Iran, sec Ashraf, 
pp. 3181f. 2 Minorsky, Tar/fl.kirat al-M11/iik, p. 81. 3 Chardin IV, 93. 
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represent the members' interests. All in all, their influence on society 
was slight. Only in a very restricted sense might we speak of communal 
self-government in the western European sense. 
In the large cities every conceivable trade was to be found. Du Maos 
lists 35 different craft guilds in I~fahän in 1660.1 To these must be 
added the service-trades - victual-dealers, bakers, cooks - and also 
such people as dancers, jugglers, beggars, dervishes and sayyids, all of 
whom belonged to guilds. This multiplicity of trades was not a special 
feature of the Safavid period: <i government manual from the second 
half of the 8th/14th century lists a similar number of taxable trade 
associations in Tabriz.2 In medium-sized and small cities one often 
found a certain concentration of particular trades. In Y azd, for exam-
ple, the manufacture of costly textiles predominated, while Käshän was 
famous for its ceramics and, increasingly, for its carpets. Similar exam-
ples can be adduced for almost every city in the country. 
Those engaged in commerce plied their trades chiefly in the great 
bazaars of the cities. The bazaar was often the property of the divän or 
of the crown, and in many cases bazaars were endowments.3 The 
tradesmen then had to pay rents for their shops, which served also as 
workshops. This applied also to the city's cattle-markets, slave-
markets, storehouses, caravansarais, bridges and baths, the rents from 
which provided an important source of income for the public treasury, 
the crown, or the vaqf administration. The central area of the bazaars 
in the large cities - the qai.yarryya - was always crown property. The 
traders who exposed there for sale the choicest and costliest wares (e.g. 
expensive fabrics, jewels,. luxury imports from distant lands) had to 
pay considerable sums of money for the privilege.4 
At this point a particular form of bazaar must be mentioned. The 
royal headquarters sometimes moved from one place to another. This 
happened for a variety of reasons; e.g. war, or the search for climati-
cally favourable summer- or winter-quarters. This habit was indulged 
especially by the Jalayirid, the Timurid, and the Türkmen rulers. On 
these occasions the whole court, led by the ruler, would forsake the 
capital city and take off for another, often far distant, part of the 
country where amid great pomp and ceremony a royal court encamp-
ment would be set up. The considerable needs of this encampment 
1 Du Mans, pp. 19i-211. 2 Hinz, Resälä-:;e Falakiyyä, pp. 178/f. 
3 Petrushevsky, in CHiv, io6-8, and Kishävarzin, 28. Kaempfer, pp. 941f. 
• Kaempfer, p. 'l7· 
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were supplied by an army of scurrying tradesmen who on such occa-
sions often came long distances to take advantage of this urdü-bäzär 
(i.e. "market of the court and army camp"). On the camp being struck, 
the provisional bazaar likewise was dissolved. This institution of the 
Il-Khäns was still common under the Äq Quyünlü, and provided the 
merchants with an enormous turn-over. Not until the time of the 
Safavids did the urdü-bäzär lose its importance. This market, too, was 
regarded as a crown institution, and the revenues from it were con-
siderable. 
Besides such institutions there were also industries, the income from 
which went to the public treasury, to the crown, or to the vaqf admin-
istration. The origin of these industries may be connected with the 
captive and enslaved workers who were set to work at various crafts in 
the palaces of the Il-Khäns and, at a later date, of 1imür and even of his 
successors. At all events, from the 8th/14th century onwards such 
industries were tobe found in many cities. The main industries of this 
sort were: tanning, pickling and preserving, soap-manufacture, paper-
making, dyeing. The mints, too, must be listed among these "state" 
industries. The income from the mint, which came chießy from min-
tage, that is the difference between the real and the nominal value of the 
coin, flowed constantly into the royal treasury. 1 
There was one special form of industry that mainly emerged in the 
Safavid empire: the btryütät (literally "houses") or "royal workshops". 
These court workshops and court industries of the Safavids were sited 
inside the royal palace grounds. Their function was chiefly the prepar-
ation of every imaginable product that the court might need. The 
buyütät comprised, firstly, departments connected in any way whatever 
with the supply of victuals for the court. Near the court kitchen were 
the food warehouse, the bakery, storerooms for drinking water and 
fruit juices, the wine-cellar, slaughterhouse, the coffee-kitchen, the 
pharmacy and the rest. Then there were storehouses and rooms of 
various kinds for firewood, torches and lamps, for tablecloths, plates 
and crockery, for carpets and rohes ofhonour. The royal treasury, too, 
must be listed here. All the departments which employed manual la-
bour for the provision of the needs of the court household were court 
workshops in the true sense. Thus the court controlled its own looms, 
1 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 196. Rashid al-Din Fai:l-Alläh, M11kätabät, ed. 
M. Shafi' (Lahore, 1941), p. 318. Yakubovsky, "Timur", pp. 721f. 
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its own tailoring, shoemaking, and fur and leather industry. There was 
a goldsmith's workshop and a copper smithy, which supplied the court 
with all manner of tools and utensils; and there were many other 
departments as weil. Finally, mention must be made of the harness-
maker's workshop, the armoury, the ordnance-foundry, and the library 
in which manuscripts were not only collected but specially produced 
by a staff of artists. The stables and many other offices were also part of 
the buyütät.1 
As a rule there was a director (fäpib-jam') and a controller (mushrif) 
over each department. This rule was broken, however, where, for 
operational reasons, several departments worked closely together and 
were therefore from time to time put under a single ~ä}:iib-jam' or a 
single mushrif. In the late Safavid period the buyütät were entirely 
under the direction of the näzir-i b~ütät ("overseer of the court work-
shops"). This had not always been so: at the beginning of the 11th/17th 
century the nä?ir-i buyütät had controlled only certain specific court 
industries and workshops. Later, however, he was de facto in charge of 
the, whole royal household and was reckoned to be one of the most 
powerful and infl.uential ministers of state. 
Countless workmen and specialists with a variety of professional 
skills were employed in the court industries. In contrast to their col-
leagues in the bazaars they enjoyed a number of privileges. Each em-
ployee was given a deed of appointment which indicated precisely the 
manner of his work and his rate of pay. In the late Safavid period the 
annual wage of a workman ranged from two tümäns to the consider-
able sum of 5 5 tumäns. This was paid in the form of barat - the 
assignment of certain tax returns. One of the employees was commis-
sioned to cash these tax-cheques on the spot, so that in fact most 
employees got a cash payment, although forfeiting in the process 
5-10% of the wage stated in their deed of appointment. Every third 
year an employee at a court workshop could count on receiving a 
wage-increase. In addition he had the right to specific allowances in 
kind Uira). Emoluments in kind were calculated in terms of a unit 
known as the qäb ("dish"). Six or seven persons were supposed to be 
able to find subsistence from the food contained in one qäb. Highly 
paid workmen received a whole qäb, others only half or a quarter. On 
request one could have the jira commuted into cash. As well as these 
1 Kaempfer, pp. I06ff. Chardin vu, 33off. Minorsky, Tar!!Jkirat al-Mulük, p. 50. 
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regular wages tbe employees at tbe buyiitat received premiums or 
"gifts" (in'am), often amounting to as mucb as a year's wages. This 
occurred principally wben a workman bad distinguisbed himself by 
specially good work. t 
An appointment in tbe buyiitat was normally for life. In case of 
illness or unfitness for work tbe salary continued tobe paid. Moreover, 
it also bappened tbat many of tbe workmen worked not only by royal 
commission, but on tbeir own account as well. All of tbese facts sbow 
tbat a post in court industry at a court worksbop was in many respects 
a privileged post, and must bave been mucb sougbt after. 
In conclusion let us mention tbe activities of European workmen in 
tbe buyiitat. Under 'Abbas I, Safi I and 'Abbas II a series of painters 
worked at tbe court at I~fabän. Tbere are several reports of watcbmak-
ers, but it is not clear wbetber tbese were always attacbed to tbe 
buyiität. Several European specialists were employed in tbe ordnance-
foundry at court, and it is possible tbat tbeir number increased under 
Sbab Sultan J:Iusain (1105-35/1694-1722), for at tbis time tbe produc-
tion of artillery was being stepped up.2 
THE TAX SYSTEM IN THE POST-MONGOL PERIOD 
During tbe centuries of tbe 'Abbasid Calipbate it bad been customary 
to observe, formally at least, tbe tax regulations prescribed by tbe 
SbarI'a, even if tbe four canonical taxes - khariij (tax on land and 
agricultural products), 'ushr (titbe), zaklit (alms-tax) andjizya (capita-
tion tax for non-Muslims) - covered tbe most heterogeneous institu-
tions, and tbe rate of taxation differed greatly from place to place and 
from time to time, and special impositions bad often assumed tbe 
cbaracter of regular taxes. In Iran tbis principle was overtbrown dur-
ing tbe first decades of 11-Kbanid rule: tbe qubchiir tax took its place 
alongside tbe canonical kbaraj and quickly proved to be tbe most 
oppressive taxation ever imposed upon tbe settled population.3 In tbe 
11-Kbanid period tbe term qubcbiir - originally a pasture-tax on tbe 
Mongol nomad berdsmen - denoted various types of tax. For tbe 
arable farming community tbe qubcbiir was a levy assessed according 
to tbe quantity of tbe product, and bad to be paid in casb. In many 
1 lbid., p. 2 1. 
2 lbid. Schuster-Walser, Das rafawidische Persien, pp. 13ff. Busse, Untersuchungen, pp. 1361f. 
3 Petrushevsky, in CHI v, 1301f., and Kishävarzin, 2281f. 
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districts the qubchür was a fairly uniform fixed tax on all subjects and 
thus a capitation levy on Muslims too.t Cattle-breeders also were liable 
for qubchür dues, which again had tobe paid in cash, not in cattle, as bad 
originally been the custom with the Mongols. The zakät was superseded 
by the tamghä, introduced by the Il-Khäns. This was a set of taxes on 
trade and industry, the combined rate of which was several times greater 
than the 21/2 % of the canonical alms-tax. In addition, the 11-Khanid 
regime imposed a great number of oppressive special burdens upon the 
population of Iran, most of all upon the settled community. The exac-
tion of taxes by the administrators of the 11-Khanid state bad been brutal 
and capricious and had threatened the life of great sections of the Iranian 
peasantry. When reform came under Ghazan Khän (694-703/1295-
1304), there was not by any means a return to the norms laid down in the 
Shari'a. Such a course would have deprived the rulers of a substantial 
part of t.heir income. What took place was, rather, the systematisation 
and codification of the practices that had been in operation since the 
middle of the 7th/ l 3 th century. On the basis of this reform the canonical 
taxes continued for the time being, but income for the public treasury 
was assured by the cataloguing of a wide range of additional dues. This 
seems nonetheless to have been to the advantage of the populace, 
because the fixing of the rate of taxation put a stop in some measure to 
the often immoderate demands of the tax-collectors. 
The co-existence of canonical taxes and of levies that were not 
consistent with the Shari'a, plus many special burdens - some of which 
admittedly had been customary even before the Mongol conquest of 
the Near East - is plainly characteristic of the post-Mongol period as 
well. As early as the 8th/14th century there appeared tendencies to 
obliterate the distinction between canonical and non-canonical taxes. 
Attempts to put a stop to this development were made repeatedly, as 
for example under the Timurid Shäh Rukh (SII-50/1409-47), under 
the Aq Quyünlü rulers Ya'qüb (883-96/1478-90) and AJ;imad 
(902-3/1497), and also under Shah Tahmäsp (930-984/1524-1576). 
Such intentions seem also to have played some part, albeit a limited 
one, in the tax reform ofUzun l:fasan (857-82/1453-78).2 The assiini-
1 Minorsky and Minovi, "Na~ir al-Din Tüsi on finance", pp. 79-80. Busse, Unters11ch11ngen, 
p. 104. TMEN r, 387-91 (no. 266, "qubfor"). Barthold, "Die persische Inschrift", p. 26t. 
2 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 191; "Das Rechnungswesen", p. 121; and 
"Steuerinschriften", pp. 718ff. Minorsky, "The Aq-qoyunlu and Land Reforms", pp. 45 Iff., 458ff. 
Schmidt-Dumont, Turkmenische Herrscher, p. 219. 
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lation of non-canonical and canonical taxes was finally accomplished, it 
would seem, in the 11th/17th century, presumably under 'Abbäs I. His 
fiscal measures came at the end of a continuous series of tax reforms. 
They were preceded by the codification and the regulation of the 
financial system during the second half of the 8th/14th century (the 
Jalayirid period) and by the creation of the Qiiniin-i ( or Qiiniin-niima-yz) 
J:Iasan Piidishiih, the tax book of Uzun l:fasan Äq Quyiinlii. Common to 
all of these reforms is that, as we observed about the tax laws of 
Ghazan Khän, they have to do only in part with the introduction of 
totally new measures; for the rest they are concerned with the collating 
of detailed arrangements and of usages that had come into existence at 
an earlier stage. Thus, for example, the returns contained in the Qiiniin 
of Uzun J:Iasan concerning eastern Anatolia - so important for our 
consideration - show tremendous variation from place to place, in 
respect both of the type of tax and of the rate of taxation. The reason 
for this can be traced to the fact that over a lang period of time 
accepted local traditions bad found their way into J:Iasan's code. And 
so, such returns as these give us some idea also of fiscal conditions 
before the codification of the Qiiniin .1 And there are some other sources 
which provide data concerning the tax system. As we explained in 
another context, records of tax exemptions always provide valuable 
evidence, for, in the form of tax lists, they indicate to which type of 
levy the exemption in question applied. On this subject the number of 
extant documents from the Safavid period is much greater than the 
number from the 9th/1 5th century or even earlier. Manuals of adminis-
tration often supply valuable information on this score, and data of this 
kind in the records can be augmented from many reports by European 
travellers. We shall initially follow the development down the centuries 
of the most important regular taxes, and then discuss irregular special 
impositions. 
The first thing to note is that soon after the collapse of the Il-Khanid 
state the terms kharäj and zakät occur less frequently in the sources. 
This applies also to the Mongol expression qubchiir, presumably be-
cause in the popular mind this conjured up memories of the worst kind 
of fiscal exploitation. From the second half of the 8th/14th century 
onwards, in place of these terms we find miil and jihiit, and from the 
9th/15th century onwards they are linked to form miil-u-jihiit. Both of 
1 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 179. 
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these expressions possessed a comprehensive connotation: mäl em-
braced the totality of the regular taxes that were payable in kind (that 
is, chiefly levies on agricultural products), whereas jihät were indirect 
taxes to be paid in cash. 1 Amongst these were obviously the regular 
commercial taxes, but there were also the cattle levies, to be paid in 
cash (cf. below) and the taxation of land, in which certain elements of 
the traditional misä~a regulations for the kharäj survived. In documents 
from the 9th/15th century onwards we find mäl-u-jihät along with 
vujiihät (money-taxes of the most varied kinds, presumably mainly dues 
to officials) set in contrast to the takälif-i diväni (special dues for the 
state household) and other extraordinary payments. In the manuals of 
administration, too, we meet this term mäl-u-jihät, but here, as we 
might expect, we find rather the specification of the separate classes of 
levy which made up the totality of the taxes. From this we are able to 
deduce that mäl-u-jihät va vujühät quite simply denoted all regularly 
collected taxes. lt is clear that mäl-u-jihät in predominantly agricultural 
regions denoted chiefly taxes upon land and its produce, whereas in 
urban contexts it denoted chiefly taxes upon trade and industry.2 
The rate of taxation of farm produce varied considerably from place 
to place and from time to time. Whereas under the Mongols after the 
reforms of Ghazan Khän the tithe had to be paid in kind, plus an 
additional high tax on produce in cash (one of the so-called qubchür 
taxes), with the Jalayirids the tendency developed of shifting these cash 
qubchür payments (tax on produce and the poll tax introduced by the 
Tl-Khäns) into the field of extraordinary taxation. This apparent easing 
of the burden of the tax on produce promptly made possible the 
collection of a larger proportion in kind as harvest tax. Under Uzun 
.f:Iasan in most localities the tithe was replaced by the "fifth" (khums, 
pa'!f-yak), andin many regions of Transcaucasia the harvest tax claimed 
as much as three-tenths of the whole harvest. In view of this severe 
oppression of the peasants it is scarcely conceivable that Uzun .f:Iasan's 
regulations found a favourable reception. About a hundred years later 
in most districts the khums, or slightly less, was still in force. Accord-
ing to d'Alessandri, towards the end of the reign of Tahmäsp I 
(930-84/ 15 24-76) only one-sixth of the harvest was claimed.3 Chardin 
reports of the 11th/17th century, however, that on crown .estates the 
1 Hinz, "Steuerinschriften", p. 76 j . 
2 Minorsky, "A Soyiirghäl ofQäsim b. Jahängir", p. 94l· Hinz, Resälä:Je Falakiyyä, p. IZ9. 
> Minorsky, T ad!Jkirat al-Muliik, p. 178. 
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tax on produce accounted for one-third of the entire yield. In the 
region around I~fahän at the beginning of the 12th/ 18th century a 
quarter of the harvest (chahär-yak) was claimed. 1 These levies applied 
primarily to grain. Orchards and vegetable gardens were taxed on the 
basis of a tithe or a seventh part of the annual yield. In the 8th/14th, 
and in the first half of the 9th/ 1 5 th, century vineyards were often 
subject to the khums, but under Uzun I:Iasan this levy was commuted 
into cash (in eastern Anatolia every hundred vines were assessed at the 
flat rate of about two Ottoman aqchas).2 This may well indicate that at 
that time the greater part of the grape harvest was pressed, so that there 
was no point in claiming a levy on the fruit. The sale of the wine was 
subject to various commercial taxes, so that it paid the public treasury 
on the one hand to put a flat rate on the vineyards, and on the other to 
encourage wine production to the limit. This tax, known as razkäri, 
was in operation throughout the whole period under review, as one 
document from the year 1094/ 168 3 demonstrates. 3 
Another mäl tax in kind consisted in the supplying of hay, chaff, or 
firewood. According to the regulations of Uzun I:Iasan the tenant of a 
juft was liable to supply from one to four kharvärs (ass-load, cf. Hinz, 
Masse u. Gewichte, p. 14) of the materials indicated. All of these dues 
became payable at harvest, except the firewood, which had tobe deliv-
ered in late autumn. The fixing of the precise quantities and sums to be 
given was the responsibility of the mumqyyiz or rqyyä',4 the assessor of 
the harvest, whose underlings performed this task a short time before 
the harvest. In order to protect himself from too high an assessment, 
the peasant had to pay the rayyä' and his staff both an assessment-due 
(introduced in the Aq Quyünlü period) and also the so-called taqabbu-
lät. These dues became payable "when a tax-payer agrees to the assess-
ment fixed by the revenue-officer."5 Evidently this was a case of legal-
ised bribery. Not without some amazement do we find the taqabbulät, 
in an administrative manual of the early 18th century, among the regu-
lar state revenues.6 
In this category must certainly be included the land tax collected in 
various regions - the rasm-i juft. Under Uzun I:Iasan the rasm-i juft 
passed in some districts as being consistent with the "old law".7 Here 
1 Chardin v, 384, 392. 2 Hinz, "DasSteuerwesenOstanatoliens",p.18i. 
3 Busse, Unters11ch11ngen, document no. 20. 4 Sie! See Minorsky, Tad!Jkirat a/-M11/iik, p. 1 jO. 
s Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, p. 44i. 6 Minorsky, Taefbkirat a/-M11/iik, p. 76. 
7 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 180. 
537 
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS 
we are dealing with a tax payable in cash and, under Uzun I:Jasan, 
varying in rate from district to district (and dhimmis were further 
assessed at a higher rate than Muslims). D'Alessandri finds.evidence for 
the existence of this tax in the late 10th/16th century, and Kaempfer 
puts the rate at five 'abbäsis per jarib for the reign of Shah Sulaimän. 1 
From Kaempfer and from Chardin we learn also that in the second half 
of the 17th century this category of payment included a contribution to 
the bärkhäna-:Ji Shäh ("royal goods-caravan"), claiming the choicest 
produce of the various regions. The yield from both taxes flowed into 
the coffers of the rulers. That these two interchangeable taxes repre-
sented a later form of the rasm-i juft can be seen from the fact that they 
were expressly catalogued among the regular taxes. 
The same dichotomy in ~asic taxation can be observed in the realm 
of cattle-rearing, down to the second half of the 1oth/ 16th century. By 
a decree of Ya'qub Äq Quyünlü dated 1 5 Ramac;län 8 84/ 30 November 
1479 the addressee of the document was exempted from paying the 
taxes of maväshi(cattle-tax) and marä'i(pasture-tax).2 In the tax-regula-
tions of Uzun I:Jasan both types of tax are mentioned. Let us first 
examine the cattle-tax. After the end of the Il-Khanid state it continued 
to be known for some time as qubchiir-i rasmi or qubchür-i aghnäm, 
expressions going back to the reforms of Ghazan Khan and current 
down to the Timurid period. In the Qänün-i J:Iasan Padishäh we find the 
above form maväshl.3 In eastern Iran in 15 oo there existed a tax called 
pi!J-i gaväna, which clearly was identical with this cattle-tax.4 Under 
Shah Tahmäsp, who was renowned for his piety, this undoubtedly 
non-canonical exaction was camouflaged in the colours of the SharI'a, 
by being interpreted as one form of the alms-tax and named zakät-i 
gusfand va maväshi. Obviously, however, even this formal re-interpreta-
tion was not sufficient to calm the conscience of the sanctimonious 
Tahmäsp, for in 972/1565 he had it totally annulled as being unlawful. 5 
From the time of 'Abbäs I onwards the cattle-tax, now called 
chüpän-bigi, once again took its place as a fixed element in the mäl-
u-jihät and remained so until the 18th century. 
Under Uzun I:Iasan in many districts the maväshI tax consisted of 
1 Minorsky, Tad)Jkirat al-Muliik, p. 179. 
2 Busse, Untersuchungen, document no. 3. On the term marä'i, see Minorsky and Minovi, "Na~ir 
al-Din Tüsi on finance", p. 78. 
3 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 199, and "Steuerinschriften", p. 756. Busse, 
Untersuchungen, p. 107. • Roemer, Staatsschreiben, p. i67. 
5 Hinz, "Steuerinschriften", pp. 759, 766. 
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two levies: one was a cash payment of from o/J to one aqcha for each 
wether-sheep or goat (in Anatolia), to which was added a herd-tax in 
kind - a stated number of livestock incurred, in varying amounts, fixed 
levies, for example one beast per year for every three hundred sheep. In 
addition female stall-cattle were taxed in cash: mares, cows, and asses 
incurred a tax of from 2 to 4 Y2 aqchas per beast.1 There are records from 
the reign of Tahmäsp of tax rates of 1 5 bisti for every forty sheep 
(excluding tups) and 10 for each bullock.2 Obviously these rates were in 
force before the above-mentioned cancellation of the cattle-tax in 1565. 
Under 'Abbäs I, in the province of Khuräsän alone, the chupän-bigI 
yielded annually the sum of about 20,000 'Iräqi tumäns, and this shows 
that here, too, we are dealing with a tax that had tobe paid in cash.3 Of the 
late 17th century Chardin reports, however, that the chupän-bigI for sheep 
had to be paid in kind: one-seventh of the lambs and the whole yield of 
fleeces. Foals were assessed at one-third of their fictive price (supposedly 
fairly assessed) in cash. In any case, in this period the ruler was the direct 
beneficiary of the income from the chupän-bigI.4 
The pasture-tax, too, can be traced back to the period of Mongol 
rule in Iran, and is explicitly mentioned in the Qäniin of Uzun J:lasan. 
Later on it frequently became merged with the categories of cattle-tax 
listed, but we have evidence that in the time of Tahmäsp I it was still 
separate.5 
Regular taxation of urban commercial activity primarily affected 
trade and crafts - the latter at first only slightly. Of course the agricul-
tural activity of individual city-dwellers is not in question here: in 
terms of the total tax yield from the cities revenues from this source 
were of no great importance. 6 
The most important of the levies imposed upon trade were the 
customs and sales taxes. From the time of Ghazan Khän these are tobe 
reckoned as the most important regular revenues of the public trea-
sury. Craft and industry were obviously liable to taxation on sales, but 
in addition at certain periods shops and workshops were taxable also. 
Most of these tariffs and taxes go back to the era of the T!-Khäns, andin 
no way harmonised with the precepts of the religious law. First, let us 
1 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 18 1. 
2 Minorsky, Taefl!kirat al-M11Jiik, p. 179, quoting d'Alessandri. 
3 Iskandar MunshI, trans. Savory, p. 774. 
4 Minorsky, Taeff!kirat al-M11/iik, p. 180, following Chardin. 
5 Hinz, "Steuerinschriften", p. 764. Barkan, "Osmanh devrinde", pp. 97, 104, 195, etc. 
6 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 185. 
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take up a terminological problem. From the 8th/14th to the 1oth/16th 
century all the taxes on trade and industry were described by the term 
"tamghä". There is documentary evidence that this originally Turkish 
word (primary meaning "herd-brand"; hence later "seal" or "stamp") 
had been applied to specific taxes in Iran since the late 7th/ i; th cen-
tury. In every period the term was applied fundamentally to taxes that 
were raised on merchants and craftsmen and paid principally in cash. In 
the course of time the occasional payment in kind does, however, 
figure in the complex of tamghä taxes. We do not know exactly how 
the term tamghä came to be used in the fiscal realm. lt is possible that 
the earliest tamghä dues were the customs dues paid by merchants on 
entry into a city, on all the goods they intended to sell in that city. This 
view is supported by an early 8th/14th century tradition, according to 
which, by order of the supreme authority, the tamghä dues of various 
cities had to be displayed in writing on the city gates, so that "the 
receivers of customs ... should not, under pretext of ... (an increase in 
the tamghä) ... collect more (than was pn.scribed) nor introduce any 
innovations".1 
On the other hand Na~Ir al-Din Tüsi was already describing the 
tamghä as a kind of tax on sales.2 In any case, towards the end of the 
Il-Khanid period, the term tamghä already possessed the character of a 
comprehensive concept covering all levies, often including extraordi-
nary taxes, affecting trade and industry in the cities. The above-men-
tioned city customs dues, often designated by the word biij, were part 
of this concept, as were also taxes on sales and profits. As none of these 
levies had anything to do with the tax prescriptions of Islamic religious 
law, the word tamghä, more often in its Arabicised plural tamghävät, 
was frequently used quite simply to denote all taxes that were contrary 
to the Shari'a.3 Hence the champions of the Islamic faith (arbäb-i 
'amä'im) at all times fought for the abrogation of the tamghä, and this 
cause was taken up even by some of the rulers - either out of personal 
piety or from political considerations. But with all such "reforms" it 
was always a case of trying to resolve the contradiction that arose 
between religious ends and those forms of taxation which yielded the 
highest returns to the public purse and which the state economy simply 
1 TMEN rr, 5 j8, quoting Rashid al-Din, Jämi'ill-tavärikh. 
2 Minorsky and Minovi, "NOJ!Ir al-Din TüsI on finance", p. 7i. 
3 Ibid., pp. 78f. See further Horst, "Zwei Erlasse", p. ~02, for a document dating from late 
Ramagän 972/late April 1565. 
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could not do without. For this reason the success of every attempt to 
do away with the tamghä was very shortlived. The taxes and extraordi-
nary dues embodied under this concept had to be forthwith reintro-
duced in another guise. From the reign of Shäh Rukh we learn about 
an even simpler solution. In order to satisfy the requirements of reli-
gion the term tamghä was simply replaced by the ward zakät. 1 In India 
Bäbur and his successors frequently dispensed with the tamghä, a 
measure which must have produced almost no effect at all.2 The most 
spectacular abrogation ofthe tamghä occurred in 972/1565 in connex-
ion with a dream of the Safavid Tahmäsp. The story runs that this 
shah, notorious for his avarice, saw in a vision the Twelfth Imäm, who 
commanded the sovereign to repeal the taxes, including the tamghä, 
that were contrary to the faith.3 Naturally, these taxes disappeared 
from public life only for a short time. At all events there is evidence 
that from this time onwards the fiscal term tamghä was used less and 
less. In the l 7th century the tamghä taxes did continue in various 
forms, but there seemed no langer to be any point in embracing them 
all together under the concept of tamghä. 
The sales taxes which appeared under the Mongols were levied 
under the J alayirids mostly at the rate of about 2 Y2 % - less than under 
the ll-Khäns. Shäh Rukh's zakät sales tax still ran at 2 Y2 % in 1440, but 
in Uzun J::lasan'sQänün it was fixed at 5 %. Moreover, with the codifica-
tion of the Qäniin efforts to abrogate the tamghä seem to have been 
effective, although the agents of this abrogation were unable to carry it 
out in face of the opposition encountered from the amirs.4 The rate 
went up under the Safavids (until Tahmäsp). For Christians it was as 
high as 10%. Particularly valuable goods such as pearls, jewels and 
musk were assessed at special low rates. 
Sales taxes, as we have pointed out, were normally collected in cash. 
In several places, however, the tax on a few goods had to be paid in 
kind. Under Uzun J::lasan wine was exempted from the sales tax but 
became liable to city customs dues and special tariffs, which did not, 
however, tauch wine pressed inside the cities. Likewise possessing a 
special character was the sales tax on cattle, which in some places was 
' Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 191. Ulugh Beg, on the other hand, obviously 
agreed with the concepr of tamghä: Barthold, Ulugh &g, p. 1 28. 
2 Beveridge, The Bäbur-näma in English, p. j j j. 
3 Hinz, "Steuerinschriften", pp. n 8-69. Horst, "Zwei Erlasse". 
4 Minorsky, "The Aq-qoyunlu and Land Reforms", p. 4jO. Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanato-
liens", pp. 187, 190. 
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fixed at 4-5 % of the selling price, in other places at a fixed sum (e.g. in 
Arzinjän at 10 aqchas for one ass). In order to distinguish the sales tax 
clearly from other tamghä taxes, under Uzun f.lasan they were given 
the title tamghii-yi siyiih ("black tamghä").1 
During the 17th century the sales tax declined somewhat in import-
ance beside the great number of other taxes on trade and crafts. lt is 
possible that they were exacted only in respect of specific goods. In this 
period certainly, they were calculated not as a percentage but on a flat 
rate. Olearius reported that in 1637 one paid one 'abbiisito sell a horse, 
one mu~ammadi an ass, and one qiizbaki a sheep.2 Silk, too, was liable to 
some such sales tax. This decline of the market tax under the later 
Safavids was certainly connected with the simultaneous restructuring 
of the financial administration, which we have still to discuss. 
Because in Iran one could have the beasts one had bought (bullocks, 
sheep, lambs) slaughtered in the cattle yards (khatira), the tamghä 
which fell due in such a case represented a combination of slaughter-
ing-fees and sales tax. This slaughtering-tamghä could be paid pardy or 
wholly by surrendering the skins to the city tannery, the heads and feet 
to the city pickling and salting works, or the offal to the gut-factory.3 
There is evidence of this- custom as early as the second half of the 14th 
century; in the later 15th century the surrender of these parts of the 
animal may have become obligatory at least in certain districts. This 
special form of slaughtering fee is evidenced, however, not merely for 
eastern Anatolia and Azarbäijän, but also for central Iran, for Qum, for 
example, where as well as the skins one had to give up half a sheep's 
liver and the fat - presumably the fat on the rump of the Persian 
sheep.4 
After the sales taxes we come now to the customs dues. On this 
topic we must bear in mind that not all varieties of customs were 
regarded at all times explicitly as tamghä. At the moment, however, we 
do not wish to go any further into the question of formal classification. 
Up to the 16th century the most lucrative customs dues were the city 
customs (bäj, later also durüb), which presumably were always tamghä 
payments. They were not based upon some uniform tariff, but were 
made up of an ever-increasing number of levies, which often belonged 
neither to the category of mäl nor to that of jihät, but were officially 
1 Ibid., pp. i90, i92. 2 Schuster-Walser, Das fafawidische Persien, p. ;6. 
3 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", pp. 194ff., and Resiilä:Je Falakiyyä, pp. 176ff. 
4 Busse, Untersuchungen, document no. 4. 
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regarded as extraordinary impositions, although in practice certainly 
they very soon assumed the character of regular taxes. 1 Like the rest of 
the tamghä dues the system of city customs displays a continuous 
development from the Mongol period until the second half of the 16th 
century. Not until the time of 'Abbäs I do we find substantial changes. 
In the Il-Khanid period the goods carried by the caravans were still 
taxed at a Bat rate, and one distinguished only between the rate for 
goods to be sold within the city and the rate for goods in transit. In the 
course of time, however, there evolved a refined system of deductions 
and "administrative fees" - for so we might describe those dues levied 
on the grounds that they reimbursed those engaged directly or indi-
rectly in the work of coll~cting the customs dues. We will return to this 
topic in •ur discussion cif extraordinary taxation. 
Once again the data contained in the Qäniin-i lfasan Pädishäh are of 
assistance in providing a picture of the city customs. The basic levy 
was the due paid to the guard at the city gate, called the rasm-i bavväbi. 
This was a tax on the number of loads of goods that passed through 
the city gate, whether in or out, without distinction of quality, and 
irrespective of whether the goods were to be sold in the city or were 
merely in transit. If they were in transit, then they were taxed twice, 
once on entry, once on leaving.z Certain goods were exempt from the 
rasm-i bavväbI - for example, grain and milk products for the city's 
food supply. Peas~bts in the surrounding district could become exempt 
from the rasm-i bavväbI by paying additional dues in kind on their 
harvest. It might also happen, however, that in such cases the rasm-i 
bavväbI could be exacted in kind at the city gate. In Diyärbakr for 
fattened beasts, instead of this tax, one paid a levy of one aqcha for 
every six sheep that passed through the city gate, and this levy was 
called tamghä-yi aghnäm ("sheep tamghä"). 
In addition to the dues paid to the guard at the gate there was a 
series of further customs charges, as, for example, the fee to the scribe 
(rasm-i kitäbat or rasm-i kuttäbi), and for caravans passing through 
there was a levy called rasm-i qäbizäna.3 Duty on wine had tobe paid in 
kind. There was a fee to the master of the court cellar, a fee to the 
commandant of the fort, and to the night watchman. In spite of these 
specific designations the quantities of wine collected as city customs 
t Hinz, "Steuerinschriften'', p. 766. 
2 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 186. 3 lbid., p. 187. 
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went into the royal cellars. A special group of different levies went to 
make up the silk tax, which had to be paid in cash. Certain textile 
goods were liable to an increased silk tax. The total revenue from city 
customs amounted in general to between z % and 3 % of the value of 
the goods. Hinz points out that in the 1 5 th and 16th centuries the price 
of an article transported, say, from eastern Iran to Istanbul would 
double itself solely on account of the payment of local customs dues. 
Out-of-the-way cities sought to profit from this by enticing merchant 
caravans with the offer of lower customs rates.l 
Not only at the city gates were tolls erected. Along the great caravan 
routes, at forts, guard posts and bridges, there were road tolls (btij-i 
shaväri') to be negotiated. For a long time these taxes, known as road-
guard dues (rasm-i rähdärt), had served to maintain the guards 1tationed 
everywhere along the highways; but these were not always regarded as 
a component of the tamghä.2 
lt is now time to look at the system of tolls and tariffs in the Safavid 
state of the 17th and early 18th century. Since the reign of 'Abbas I the 
dues on the highways and, even more important, at the ports had been 
allowed to supplant city tolls as the most important source of revenue 
for the public treasury. To this must be related the fact that trade with 
foreign, principally European, powers was constantly widening in 
scope during the 17th century. The rahdärI dues had long since ceased 
to provide for the upkeep of the highway guards. Nevertheless their 
rate had been creeping up all the time, and this, along with the multi-
plication of the number of customs posts, had turned them into a 
public revenue source of the first order. A European traveller made the 
very pertinent observation, concerning the Iranian road system, that 
although one came upon scarcely any crossings or bridges one had 
nevertheless to pay up at every turn. The revenue from this abundant 
source had been flowing into the royal treasury very probably since the 
days of 'Abbas 1,3 
On the state frontiers the customs arrangements were not organised 
everywhere with the same thoroughness. The fiscal administration 
concentrated on taxing all goods imported into the country through 
the ports on the Persian Gulf, where the average rate ran at 10% of the 
estimated value of the goods. In the time of 'Abbas II (1052-
1 Ibid., p. 199. 2 Hinz, "Steuerinschriften", p. 768. Minorsky, Ttlf!/Jkirat al-Muliik, p. 76. 
3 Ibid., p. 180. Kaempfer, pp. 132 lf. Schuster-Walser, Das fafawidiscbe Persien, pp. z81f. 
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77/1642-66), from Bandar 'Abbäs alone the public treasury collected 
annually the sum of 24,000 tümäns.t Later on, this source of revenue 
was somewhat neglected; under Sulaimän it brought in only l o,ooo 
tümäns, and the office of harbourmaster, to whom belonged the super-
vision of the machinery for collecting the tariffs, was finally leased out 
in 1674 for the relatively small slim of 2,700 tümäns.2 On the Persian 
Gulf there were three large ports: Bandar 'Abbäs, Bandar Rig, and 
Bandar Kangün, each with its own independent customs house. On the 
inland frontiers and also on the Caspian Sea the customs were very 
irregularly organised. lt is worth mentioning, however, that not all 
foreign merchants were taxed at the same rate. The British, the Portu-
guese, the Dutch and the French all paid at different rates, and all were 
entitled to speci6c tariff concessions. 
Among the tamghä taxes abrogated by Tahmäsp in q65 were the 
revenues from the mints. We must note that these revenues were of 
various kinds. Anyone who on his own initiative struck coin out of 
precious metal, or had foreign currency, also of precious metal, re-
minted - a practice that became mandatory in the l 7th century - had 
to pay a fee to cover expenses. We know, however, from the later 
Safavid period that in addition the royal treasury claimed the difference 
between the real and the nominal value of every coin struck. W. Hinz 
and H. Horst argue convincingly that the mint tamghä was presum-
ably this mintage deduction, averaging 2%, rather than the fees for 
minting.3 At all events Tahmäsp's abrogation of the tamghä did not 
result in the revenues (vijibt) from this mintage being renounced for 
ever, for, as has been already pointed out, in the l 7th century this tax 
appears as one of the most lucrative sources of revenue for the royal 
treasury, andin the 6rst half of the l8th century the rate of mintage 
rose to over l 5 %.4 When discussing the monetary system we will 
return to this question. Now we turn to the last signi6cant group of 
tamghä taxes: taxes on crafts. 
In the reign of the Jalayirids, and presumably under the Timurids as 
well, the taxation of crafts was operated within the framework of the 
existent sales taxes, on the principle that it was not the manufacture but 
the sale of a product that made it liable to taxation. Relevant, too, is the 
circumstance that in the tax codes the sales tax was not computed at a 
1 Minorsky, Ta4/Jkiraf al-M11/iik, p. i81. 2 Ibid. Kaempfer, p. 93. 
3 Hinz, "Steuerinschriften", p. 766, and "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. i88. Horst, 
"Zwei Erlasse", p. 306. 4 Minorsky, Ta4/Jkirat al-M11/iik, pp. qolf. 
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flat rate for a whole city, but specified for individual professions, 
artisan guilds (a~näf) and shops. From the models provided by an 
assessment book of the year 764/1363 for the city of _Tabriz we learn 
that a sales tax was presented for close on forty professional groups and 
guilds, which proves that this tax was clearly conceived as a means of 
taxing industrial production.1 In the Qäniin of Uzun J:lasan Aq Quy-
ünlü, about a hundred years later, we detect the beginnings of the 
attempt to tax industrial production itself, irrespective of the amount 
for which the product was -s-ofd. Obviously in the period before the 
compilation of the Qäniin of Uzun J:lasan, the practice had become 
established of taxing weavers at a specified monthly or yearly rate for 
their looms. The Qäniin prescribed the tax on individual professions in 
various regions. This might be a tax on shops or workshops, as in the 
case of tradesmen, or it rnight be a straightforward tax on industry, as 
in the case of the bakers and cooks in the eastern Anatolian city of 
Kharpüt.2 As a rule these taxes seem to have been payable in cash, but 
sometimes the rates referred to payment in kind. lt is obvious that in 
the late I 5th century and thereafter these taxes on industry were re-
garded as an extension of the previous system of taxing industry ac-
cording to turn-over, for they were always conceived as tamghä levies. 
The turning point in the development of some of the taxes, which 
we have placed at the beginning of the 11th century, can be perceived 
in the sphere ofindustry as early as the reign ofTahmäsp in the second 
half of the 16th century. The historical development of the tax on crafts 
had followed a differeni course from region to region. In contrast to 
this tax as operated by the Aq Quyünlü and certainly as operated 
during the early decades of Safavid rule is the system which compre-
hensively taxed those engaged in industry. This system we find operat-
ing in the later period of Tahmäsp's reign. Because it embraced all 
urban manufacturers and subjected them to fixed levies, it was a much 
more efficient fiscal instrument than the codified usages of the Qäniin-i 
J:Iasan Pädishäh. In the often quoted administrative manual, Ta~kirat 
ai-muiiik, this taxation system is vividly presented. In accordance with 
the guidelines set down by the divän, a high city official, the kaläntar 
(in several respects not unlike a European mayor, cf. above), assisted 
t Hinz, Resiilii-ye F afafejyyä, pp. 177-8 3. 
2 Barkan, "Osmanh devrinde", p. 194· For the taxation of brothels (bait al-lutf) and gambling, 
see Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 188, and Resiilä-ye Falakryyä, p. 119; Minorsky, 
Ttl{f/Jkirat al-Muliik, pp. 139, 182. 
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by another dignitary, the naqib (probably the most distinguished of the 
sayyids, i.e. descendants of the Prophet, in the city, cf. above), decided 
on the total extent of the taxes on industry due in their city. These 
taxes, known in Tahmäsp's time as mäl-i mul;tarifa, were now called the 
buniCba. Then the kaläntar summoned the heads of the districts (kad-
kbudJ) and the elders of the guilds (risbsafidän-i afnäf) in order to 
apportion, in their presence, the bunicha-quotas to the individual 
"guilds" and other institutions. The aldermen now became responsible 
for the collection of the amounts apportioned. The bunicha payment 
was obligatory on all craftsmen, bazaar merchants, sellers at the rope 
market, cattle market, and other markets, on all bakeries, eating-
houses, inns and baths (in so far as these were not crown properties and 
thus leased by the royal treasury, as, for example, in I~fahän), and at 
times on such notorious services as taverns and brothels. 1 In the crown 
provinces the revenues from the bunicha, like all other levies, naturally 
flowed into the royal treasury, and in the other provinces they formed 
part of the regalia, so that in every case it was the sovereign who 
- profited directly from the bunicha.2 Special value was attached to the tax 
on the production of silk and cotton. According to Chardin the ruler 
received a sum equivalent to one-third of the product, quite apart from 
the fact that the export of silk was one of the most important royal 
prerogatives. The flat rate assessment of the bunicha was of advantage 
to the public treasury in yet another respect. If a particular producer was 
exempted from bunicha levies, this in no way diminished the revenue 
from taxes, for the cost was shared out by the other members of the 
guild.3 
Following Hinz's argument, we may regard the receipts from cer-
tain urban manufactures as a latent tax on industry. The fees levied, for 
example, by the city tanneries when someone brought a goatskin or 
sheepskin to have it tanned, or, as the case might be, took away the 
finished leather, were somewhat higher than the cost of running the 
industry. The surplus was claimed by the public treasury.4 Certainly 
this did not apply in every case, nor to all manufactures. lt also covered 
the processing of certain raw materials claimed as dues by fiscal 
1 Kaempfer, p. 94. On the bunicha, see Tat/kkirat al-M11/iik, pp. 81, 83; Hinz, "Steuerin-
schriften", p. 764. 
2 Kaempfer, /oc. cit. Minorsky, Tat/kkirata/-M11/iik, p. 180. Du Mans, p. H· 
3 Minorsky, Tat/kkirat a/-M11/iik, p. 83. 
4 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 196, following Barkan, "Osmanh devrinde'', 
PP· 181, 194. 
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fiscal officials. One recalls, for example, the dues payable on slaughter-
ing an animal. Moreover, the products of these urban manufacturers 
were frequently the object of a fiscal device which, under the name of 
(ar~, had been widespread since the Mongol period. The populace was 
compelled to sell certain raw materials to the fiscal office ( explicitly, to 
the manufacturer) at an artificially low price, or, alternatively, to buy 
certain products from the fiscal office at an inflated price. t As with 
many other devices this one gave the tax officials ample scope for 
malpractice, as an inscription dated 981/1 5 7 3 records concerning the 
compulsory sale of the products of the soap works at Naidz.2 
We now move on from the discussion of all those levies which were 
regarded up to the 16th century as tamghä, and which to some extent 
underwent special development during the 17th century. That does not 
mean that we have abandoned the sphere of regular taxation. To this 
sphere certainly belonged the jizya, the Quranic poll tax on non-
Muslims. This tax affected Jews and Christians, both native and foreign 
(including Europeans). The principle underlying the jizya was funda-
,mentally that every adult male dhimmi bad to pay a specified annual 
sum. As with all the other taxes, the rate of the jizya varied from place 
to place and from time to time. In the middle of the 17th century, for 
example, Armenians and Jews liable to the jizya had to pay annually 
the equivalent of one mi:fqäl of gold (i.e. 4.69 gm). Du Mans, to whom 
we are indebted for this information, tells us also that this tax was 
called either kharäj or jizya, an interesting indication of how little 
awareness there was in the 17th century of the original character of the 
canonical taxes. 3 We learn from a document of Sulaimän from the year 
1094/1683 that the Quranic poll tax for Armenians in Julra, south of 
l~fahän, was calculated at a flat rate and apportioned to the male 
members of the Armenian community by the kaläntar of the 
Armenians of J ulta in collaboration with the kadkhudäs (heads of the 
districts, elders).4 This procedure was very much in line with what we 
have already observed concerning the apportionment of the flat rate 
bunicha tax. At that time the yield from the jizya for Julta had reached 
the figure of 5 80 tümäns. In 'Abbäs I's time it had yielded only r 80 
tümäns, which may indicate that the Armenians of Julra in those days 
1 Petrushevsky, Kishävarzin, 289. Busse, Untersuchungen, document no. l· Aubin, Note prilimi-
naire, pp. qff. Lambton, Landlord and Peasant, p. io2. Hinz, "Steuerinschriften", p. 714. 
2 AJ:imad Iqtidäri, "FarmänI az Shäh Tahmäsp-i ~afavI", FIZ XII (1 H3), 319-22. 
3 Du Mans, p. 46. 4 Busse, Untersuchungen, document no. 20. 
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had been taxed at a specially low rate, in order to encourage their 
settlement there. Under 'Abbäs l's successor Safi (1038-52/1629-42) 
income from the jizya had already risen to 260 tümäns. During the 
second half of the 1 7th century the income from the jizya raised in 
Julfä flowed into the purse of the queen mother. t From the document 
mentioned above we learn that at this time the jizya contribution of 
one of the richest Ar.menian merchants and his five sons added up to no 
less than 3 5 tümäns. 
Over and above the jizya, the dhimmis were bound to pay other 
taxes as well. In the Qäniin of Uzun I:Iasan enhanced rates for certain 
taxes are indicated as applying to Christians, and we know that in the 
16th century considerably higher tax rates were imposed upon Chris-
tian merchants and manufacturers than upon their Muslim colleagues, 
a fact already mentioned above. Since the time of 'Abbäs I a great 
Armenian colony bad existed in Julfä. The above mentioned reduction 
in taxes which 'Abbäs granted the Armenians of this town did not 
continue to operate for long after his death. In the later 1 7th century 
the Christians of J ulfli were particularly hard hit by tax impositions and 
other repressive measures. An additional burden upon the Armenian 
artisans of J ulfli was that they were called upon much more frequently 
than were others to provide unpaid corvce labour. More will be said 
about this in the context of special impositions. 
A special group of foreigners were the Indians, who had flocked to 
Iran in the 17th century. These, as we have observed, applied them-
selves to monetary business and usury. A specially assessed poll tax was 
imposed upon them, and was known as saräna:Ji Huniid.2 
Besides the jizya, there was yet another form of poll tax which must 
not be confused in any way with the canonical tax on non-Muslims: the 
universal poll tax on Muslims. Let us recall once again the concept 
qubchiir as it had been understood in !he time of the Il-Khäns. One of 
these qubchür taxes had been a levy to which every subject was uncon-
ditionally liable. lt was thus a poll tax on all Muslims, in strict contra-
vention of the Shari'a. In spite of changes in the meaning of the term 
qubchür, and its ultimate disappearance in the post-Mongol period, 
this tax continued in other forms, in such forms, indeed, that it could 
be listed officially amongst the extraordinary taxes, although exacted 
1 Chardin VIII, 114. Busse, Unters11&hungen, p. 139. Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens'', 
p. 182. Kaempfer, p. 68. 2 Minorsky, Ta4/Jkirat al-M11/iik, p. 76. 
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with all the regularity of a regular tax. Under the Jalayirids this levy 
became known as saräna or sar-shumära, and in many districts the cus-
tom grew up of imposing a khäna-shumära on a whole household in-
stead of levying a poll tax in the true sense. In the Qäniin of Uzun 
J:Iasan we come across this "hearth-tax" (Hinz) in the context of extra-
ordinary taxes.1 lt was still being exacted under the Safavids. 
The same sort of thing happened in respect of the host of taxes in the 
form of "administrative dues". These too did not pass without reserva-
tion as regular taxes, and yet de facto were exacted on a regular basis and 
frequently formed an official component of regular levies, as was dem-
onstrated above regarding the composition of the tamghä on wine. 
Such dues undoubtedly constituted an essential element in the compre-
hensive concept of vujühät to which we referred earlier. They were 
designated ikhriijät (literally "expenses", signifying reimbursement of 
expenses incurred in the course of taxing and administering), rusiim or 
~uqiiq (more or less "dues", to those in whose favour they were 
granted). A distinction was drawn between muqarrari dues, which were 
regular exactions, and khärijryyät, which were ad hoc extraordinary 
dues.2 lt was undoubtedly true of many dues that their true application 
did not coincide with the purpose indicated by their title. This was 
especially obvious with those which were of long standing. For exam-
ple, in Uzun J:Iasan's time and later, in certain districts of eastern 
Anatolia a rasm-i timiitjak was raised, a "Timür due", when the con-
queror had been dead and buried for fifty years. lt is clear that in such a 
case an originally extraordinary imposition had become a regular tax.3 
Obviously the contrary could also occur: the due reached the actual 
nominee. This probably happened all the time if the recipient were 
someone in a high position. Thus the rasm-i nqyib of I:Iasan's Qäniin 
most certainly found its way to the crown's deputy. Equally the rasm 
al-vizära, known in the time of the Jalayirids, went to the vizier, whose 
upkeep at the end of the Safavid period was provided for almost 
entirely out of dues;4 and the rasm al-fadära was instituted for the 
benefit of the ~adr. This latter tax had been in operation since the 15th 
century, and under the Safavids the suyürghäls, too, were liable to it, as 
was mentioned in another context.5 A characteristic of many dues was 
t Petrushevsky, Kishävarzi n, 278, quoting Nakhchiväni, Dastiir al-kätib. Hinz, "Das Steuer-
wesen Ostanatoliens", p. 182. 2 Petrushevsky, in CHI v, 5 34. 
' Barkan, "Osmanlt devrinde", p. 104. 4 Minorsky, Tad/Jkirat al-M11/iik, p. 86 (§ 86). 
5 Ibid. (§ 87). Busse, Unters11ch11ngen, documents nos. 3, 4. Hinz, Resälä:Je Falakiyyä, pp. 43, 48. 
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their persistence, often throughout several centuries: once such a per-
quisite was introduced, the recipient could hardly bring himself to 
renounce the income it brought. Thus the due for the governor of the 
city or the district (shibna, becoming däriigha under the Timurids) was 
exacted under all the dynasties with which we are concerned as rasm-i 
shibnagi, däriighagäna (under the Timurids) or rasm-i däriigha.1 
Another distinction may have lain in whether the due had been 
imposed for some higher official in the general administration (e.g. 
näyib, ~adr, vizier) or for an official who was actively engaged in the 
collection of one or more taxes. In the latter case the dues - at least at 
the time of their introduction - possessed the character of extraordi-
nary taxes, as in the case of reimbursement fees for tax officials in 
general (rusiim-i 'ummäl, l;aqq al-ta/;fil) or dues destined for the assessor 
of taxes (though not to be confused with the aforementioned taqabbu-
lät). This had originally been the case with the rasm-i bavväbI and 
rasm-i kuttäb, which we mentioned along with the city gate customs, 
although by the time of Uzun J:Iasan they had already taken on the 
character of regular fiscal revenues. The same was true of the road 
customs dues (rähdärI), which had originally maintained the highway 
guards but in the course of time became a component of regular state 
revenue or of the ruler's income. 
Many dues had been conceived as supplementary levies, in the sense 
that their rate was computed as a percentage of other taxes. There were 
other dues, however, which had fixed rates. 
A complete enumeration of all dues and a detailed exposition of their 
significance and development would go far beyond the framework of 
this present study. We must be content, therefore, with the foregoing 
reflections, and may sum up by stressing the fact that many of these 
impositions, although not by any means all of them, revealed a ten-
dency to take on the character of regular state revenues, a tendency 
which expressed itself in the increasing alienation of the imposition 
from its original purpose as well as in the transition from "secondary 
rates", i.e. rates calculated as percentages of other taxes, to primary, 
fixed rates. 
Another group of special impositions, fundamentally having some-
thing in common with the dues of which we have been speaking, 
1 Busse, Unters11ch11ngen, pp. 108, 111 (rasm-i däriighagi). Roemer, Staatsschreiben, p. 166. Barkan, 
"Osmanh devrinde", p. IOj (resmi fahnegi). Hinz, "Steuerinschriften'', p. 7l4· 
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comprised those levies imposed, originally at least, on particular occa-
sions during the year. In this sphere, too, the tendency of extraordinary 
impositions to become regular taxes can be detected. We discover, for 
example, a feast-day levy and a wedding levy listed in the Qaniin of 
Uzun J:Iasan under the category of extraordinary impositions. lt is 
quite clear, especially of the wedding levy, that these taxes, when first 
introduced, must have fallen due on the occasion of the particular 
event. The Qäniin, however, indicates that the term when both of these 
taxes fall due is the beginning of spring, which can only mean that 
these extraordinary impositions had become disguised as regular taxes 
on the population.1 
The yield from genuine regular taxation - often described as a1l-i 
mäl-u-jihät or, in respect of non-Muslims, as a1l-i jizya - was augmented 
by surcharges in the form of specific percentages of the amounts 
yielded by the afl. These additions to regular taxes were known as 
tafavut (literally "the difference"). In Mongol times the word used had 
been Jar'. The documents usually speak of tafavut-i mäl-u-jihät and of 
tafävut-i jizya. The original purpose of the tafävut may have been to 
offset a putative increase in production without having to revise the 
fixed tax rates, an operation which would have involved considerable 
administrative expense. In fact, however, the tafävut levies were little 
other than an easily contrived means of increasing the principal taxes. 
They had been exacted even in Mongol times and can be traced down 
to the late Safavid period.2 
One special category of extraordinary taxes consisted of obligations 
which were not discharged directly through payment in cash or in 
kind. Here, too, the usage observed was essentially Il-Khanid in origin. 
First to be mentioned in this connexion are those services which peas-
ants bad to give to travelling officials, whom they had to accommodate 
along with their entire retinue. This service was called qunalghä. They 
were required also to provide for these people and their animals. In 
respect of persons, the obligation was called 'alafa and, in respect of 
animals, 'uliifa. The word ulägh denoted the duty of peasants to provide 
such officials and their retinues with mounts; while uläm denoted the 
obligatory service of providing local guides. The manner and form of 
exacting these services, even under the later Safavids, was very much in 
1 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 182. 
2 Petrushevsky, Kishävarzi n, 264, and "K istorii instituta 'soyurgala"', p. 239. See also 
Papazian, Persidsleie DokMmenty, e.g. n, no. 28. 
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line with Il-Khanid usage.t The documents show that from the Mongol 
period until the end of the Safavid period other services were required 
which were known by the names bigar and shikär. The latter term probably 
applied to unpaid service at the hunt, including possibly the supply of 
beaters. Bigär denoted corvie services of all kinds, principally that of 
supplying agricultural labour. The number of days of such service pre-
scribed for peasants could not at any time have been so very great. In 
Uzun I:Iasan's time, for example, only from one to three days a year were 
required, and exemption could be bought by payment of a moderate cash 
sum.2 
The urban craftsmen, however, especially in the Safavid period, 
were subject to a much more exacting type of bigär. They were called 
out to work chiefly on the large building projects of the shah. In this 
way it was possible for the ruler to execute large-scale plans without 
drawing too drastically on the treasury - one is put in mind of the 
architectural embellishment of the capital l~fahän by 'Abbäs I and his 
successors. The organisation of such a comprehensive system of labour 
services was handled by precisely the same methods as the bunicha, the 
tax on industry: the kaläntars decided on the quota of men required, 
and passed this on through the "guild" elders to the craftsmen in the 
guilds (a~näf). The Armenians qf Julfä, called upon frequently on 
account of their manual skills to perform such unpaid work, presum-
ably were not organised in guilds according to profession. The Arme-
nian kaläntar of Julfä, in collaboration with the kadkhudäs (heads of 
the separate residential districts ), apportioned the work to the inhabi-
tants of a city quarter who practised the particular craft.3 
Finally, important revenues of the public treasury included every 
conceivable form of "gift'', squeezed out of the people at every possi-
ble opportunity. There was scarcely a European traveller who was not 
moved to report in astonishing detail the unlimited appetite of lranian 
rulers for an enormous range of valuable "gifts" from the provinces 
and from individuals, as well as their confiscation of property. In this, 
too, we see the persistence of Il-Khanid institutions and customs. 4 
t Busse, Unters11Ch11ngen, pp. IOj ff. Minorsky, "A Soyürghäl of Qäsim b. Jahängir", p. 948. 
Petrushevsky, Kishävarzin, 294-300. 
2 Hinz, "Das Steuerwesen Ostanatoliens", p. 182. For bigär, sec Petrushevsky, Kishävarzin, 
290-4. 
3 Chardin v, 404. Minorsky, TaU/;kirat al-M11/iik, pp. 20, 181. Busse, Unters11Ch1'flgen, document 
no. 20. 
4 Kaempfer, p. 93. Chardin III, 230, and v, 430. Minorsky, TaU/;kirat al-M11/iik, p. 179. Petru-
shevsky, in CHI v, j35, quoting Rashid al-Din. 
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The following observations are meant to provide a rough sketch of 
the administrative background to the tax system. During the period of 
our review, we can detect in general a far reaching continuity in state 
fiscal institutions. lt must first be stated, however, that the division of 
the administration into two components under 'Abbäs I and his succes-
sors brought about certain changes in this sphere also. 
Together with the state chancellery the central finance administra-
tion formed the Grand Di.viß-(divän-i a' lä), at the head of which stood 
the Grand Vizier. This linking of finance chamber and chancellery 
dates back, possibly, to Ni?äm al-Mulk, the celebrated statesman of the 
time of the Great Saljüqs. One of its consequences was that the Grand 
Vizier was ultimately responsible for the financial affairs of the state. 
Nonetheless, the real h~ad of the finance chamber was the mustaufi 
al-mamälik. Since the time of 'Abbäs I his counterpart had been the 
mustaufi-yi khäua, who was responsible for the financial affairs of the 
crown estates.1 At all events this sharing did not of necessity bring 
with it - at least not until the last decades of the 1 7th century - a 
twofold structure in all of the lower sections of the finance chamber. 
Even in the time of the Il-Khäns the mustaufi al-mamälik was 
assisted at the head of the finance chamber by two more high officials, 
although both were of lesser rank: the mushrif al-mamälik and the nätir 
al-mamälik. Obviously, in directing the financial administration the 
primary function of this trio was to exercise mutual control. The same 
trio was to be found in all provincial and regional finance chambers 
also. All regional mustaufis were subject to the mustaufi al-mamälik, 
and, correspondingly, the mushrifs and nä?irs were ultimately subject 
to the mushrif al-mamälik and nä?ir al-mamälik respectively. In the 
Safavid nät,ir-i daftarkhäna-yi humäyiin-i a' lä we can recognise the older 
nä?ir al-mamälik; and the mushrif al-mamälik was presumably the 
prototype of the Safavid däriigha-yi daftarkhäna.2 
The foundation of the tax system was the qäniin, the "book of 
levies". In this book were set down the rates of all taxes that had to be 
paid, based upon the data in what amounted to an archive and was 
comparable to a land register office. According to this book, the taxes 
should have been at the same level from year to year, but, as we have 
1 Hinz, "Das Rechnungswesen", p. 22. Minorsky, Ta4/;kirat al-M11/iik, pp. 25, 4l· Röhrbom, 
Provinzen und Zentralgewalt, pp. u2ff. 
2 Hinz, "Das Rechnungswesen", p. 23. Minorsky, Tar/bkiratal-M11/iik, p. 71. Busse, "Persische 
Diplomatik im Überblick," p. 240. 
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seen, this was not so in practice. For this reason, the qänün had to be 
revised from time to time. In the later Safavid period the book of 
exactions, under the title dastiir al-'amal, was placed within the depart-
ment of the fä~ib-tat!fih (see below). 1 
In order to darify the administrative procedures surrounding the 
actual collection of taxes we have to discuss two more concepts: tax 
farming and tax cheque (barät). The raising of the various taxes in 
separate districts and regions was leased out, always under contract, to 
private persons or officials in the form of concessions which varied in 
range. On making application for such a concession, the applicant had 
to produce evidence of the state ofhis own property, for, if the applica-
tion were granted, the lessee assigned his own property as surety for 
the sum to be raised. As the owners of tiyüls or suyürghäls, as de-
scribed above, always possessed the right to collect taxes, contracts had 
to be made with them also. But they did not have to provide any 
special evidence of their own financial standing, because in most cases 
they enjoyed an exemption from tax (mu'äfI), and so the public 
treasury had no claims upon them. Hence their contracts were different 
from those of the other tax-lessees, and were given the special name 
taslim-näma.2 In all cases tax-cheques (barät) were issued to the tax 
farmers (musta'jir, mutafarrif) by the central financial administration 
and made out on the basis of the terms and rates contained in the 
qänün. The recipient had to cash these sums right away and at the end 
of the tax year balance his account, in accordance with the terms of his 
contract, whereupon he was discharged by the financial authorities. As 
we have seen, the barät system also served to remunerate or reward 
officials. This was clone by giving them tax cheques to the value of 
their salaries, drawn on a particular city or district where they could 
raise the fixed sums themselves or through an intermediary. 
These procedures were put on record in two books of the finance 
chamber. Assigned tax cheques were entered in the daftar-i tat!fih under 
the control of the ~äl:,lib-taujih. 3 In another book, the daftar-i avärija, 
appeared the current state of the tax fund for the whole territory, 
arranged by cities and provinces; and all financial transactions, includ-
ing the making out of tax cheques, had to be noted in this book, which 
was kept by the avärifa-nivis. In the 17th century the book was sub-
1 Hinz, "Das Rechnungswesen'', p. 134. Minorsky, Taef!Jkirat al-Mu/Nk, pp. 1431f. 
2 Hinz, "Das Rechnungswesen", pp. 19ff. 3 Ibid„ p. 123. Tad!;kirat al-Muliik, p. 76 (§ 66). 
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divided according to the four traditional administrative regions 
Äzarbäijän and Shirvän, 'Iräq-i 'Ajam, Kirmän and Khuräsän - and 
each district was under its own avärija-nivis.t Before making out a 
barät an the tax income of any city or province, the subordinate oflicer 
of the ~äJ:iib-taujih had, therefore, always to consult the daftar-i avärija 
in order to make sure that he was not issuing an "uncovered" cheque 
in the event of the tax capacity of the region being exhausted. In the 
Safavid period all levies which, as regalia, flowed into the crown 
treasury, although not falling within the competence of the administra-
tion of the royal estates, were withdrawn from the "balance-sheet" of 
the avärija books and, from the first half of the 17th century, recorded 
in a special department headed by the zäbita-nivis.2 
In the Mongol period the custom had already become well esta-
blished of taking the solar year as the fiscal unit of time. This year was 
based an the calculations of Na~ir al-Din TüsI. Since the time of the 
Timurids these solar years, reckoned from the beginning of spring, 
were given the year names from the Turco-Mongol twelve animal 
cycle. This manner of reckoning time - in comparison with reckoning 
in lunar years - simplified book-keeping and balancing, and eased the 
lot of the tax-payer, who otherwise - as still happened in the time of 
the 'Abbasid Caliphate - would have been taxed 3 3 times in the course 
of 32 harvests.3 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE MONETARY SYSTEM 
In Iran during the period under our review there existed throughout a 
two-tier, parallel currency, based upon gold and upon silver. Most 
coins were minted in silver, but there was always gold coinage too, 
even if seldom issued. Iranian coins in precious metal were always of a 
very high standard. Under Ghazan Khän the fineness of silver coins 
was 976/ lOoo, and in later centuries the standard rase even higher. 
From the 14th until the l Sth century the coin chiefly to be found in 
currency was silver coin. This circumstance, like several other phe-
nomena in economic life, is to be connected with the reforms of the 
Il-Khän Ghazan. During his reign (694-703/1295-1304) a new unit of 
1 Hinz, "Das Rechnungswesen", pp. 12off. Minorsky, Taffbkirat al-M11/iik, pp. 77ff., 174ff. 
2 Ibid., pp. 76, 105ff. 
3 Hinz, "Das Rechnungswesen", p. l· See further 0. Turan, Oniki h'!)Vanlt Tiirk. takvimi (Dil ve 
Tarih Cografya Fakültesi Yaymlanndan. Tarih serisi, ;. Istanbul, 1941). 
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currency was introduced: the silver dinär, called the dinär-i räyij. One 
dinär-i räyij (silver) was equal to six dirhams. According to a statement 
of Rashid al-Din, in the time of Ghazan Khän the dinär-i räyij weighed 
3 mil?qäl (at that time 4. 3 gm). The dinär thus weighed 12.9 gm. There 
were also dirham coins (2.15 gm) and coins valued at half a dirham -
all in silver. 1 The unit of reckoning was the tiimän (from the Mongol 
tümen, i.e. 10,000 ), the equivalent of 10,000 dinärs. Until the end of the 
1 8th century the silver tiimän was never struck, so that in the period 
with which we are concerned there never were any silver tiimän coins. 
In his currency reform Ghazan Khän had taken as his model the 
"Chinese tiimän", which consisted of 10,000 bälish each of six dinärs.2 
At all events, this standardisation under Ghazan Khän broke with 
Islamic tradition, which set the dinär as the unit of gold currency over 
against the dirham as the unit of silver currency. In Iran, from the 
Mongol period until its final disappearance, the dirham was regarded 
as a standardised subdivision of the (silver) dinär, and this in turn 
remained the basis of reckoning for the whole monetary system of Iran 
throughout succeeding centuries, even though at a later stage it was no 
longer minted and other monetary denominations became common. In 
what follows the most important coins with their different names and 
their dinär value will be presented, the gold value of the dinär and the 
tiimän at different periods indicated, and some idea given, conse-
quently, of the value of Iranian money in the course of the centuries 
with which we are dealing. 
That it had been one of the intentions of Ghazan's reform to adopt 
the term dinär primarily as a designation for the unit of silver currency 
can be seen from the fact that none of the gold coins of Ghazan Khän 
was named dinär ( or named as fractions of a dinär or as a dirham, 
being a fixed fraction of a dinär). This was so in spite of the fact that 
Ghazan's one mil?qäl gold coin corresponded by weight to one-third of 
a dinär or two dirhams. For a gold coin weighing one dirham (t 
mi§qäl, say 2. 15 gm) one used, obviously quite deliberately, the term 
nim-mi1qäl. 
Ghazan Khän's standard for the dinär-i räyij of three mi§qäl ( 12.9 
gm) could obviously be maintained only for a few years. By the time 
1 Rabino, Coins, Medals and Seals, p. 4. Smith, "The Silver Currency", pp. 1 Slf. For a discussion 
whether dinär-i ri!Jij or dinar-i rabil; is preferable, see Herrmann and Doerfer, "Ein persisch-
mongolischer Erlass", p. 17, n.60. 
2 Barthold, "Die persische Inschrift", pp. 2plf. Schroetter, pp. 6971f. 
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of the Il-Khän Abü Sa'Id (717-36/1317-3 5) the silver dinär weighed 
only 8.4 gm; but the original dinär-i räyij continued tobe used as a unit 
of account. 
In the period following the collapse of the Il-Khanid empire, namely 
in the second half of the 14th century, various monetary systems grew 
up in Iran. True to the Il-Khanid tradition, however, all of these were 
based upon the silver dinär, subdivided into dirhams. Whereas a dinär, 
divided into six dirhams following the tradition of Ghäzän's dinär-i 
räyij, was still minted in Tabriz, we find in Baghdäd, the capital of the 
Jalayirids, a dinär divided into 12 dirhams, and another, called the 
dtnär-i mursal, divided into rn dirhams.1 
In Nishäpür in the province of Khuräsän under Togha Temür 
(d. 754/13 5 3) a silver dinär weighing 4.21 gm and divided into 4 dirhams 
(at 1.05 gm) was minted. lt was known also as a khuräsänI or a dinär-i 
khuräsänI. However, in Khuräsän the dinär-i räyij at that time was still in 
use for account purposes.2 Another currency based on a silver dinär was 
tobe found in Transoxiana: in the ulus of Chaghatai anonymous silver 
eo ins had been minted since the late 13 th century. F rom the time of the 
reign of Kebek Khän (718-26/1318-26), however, these were struck 
with the name of a ruler, so that thereafter these coins were known as 
kapakimoney. One silver kapakI dinär weighed approximately 8 gm and 
was divided into 6 dirhams at from i.3 to i.4 gm.3 
After 792/1390 Umür had a new silver coin struck throughout the 
territories oflran. At first it was introduced obviously only into Trans-
oxiana and Khuräsän. This was the tanga-yi nuqra or silver tanga, a ward 
which seems to be of Indian origin. Originally it denoted a unit of 
weight and was applied first to a coin probably under Ma}:imüd of 
Ghazna. From the reign of Sultan Shams al-Din Iltutmish (607-33/ 
121I-36) a silver tanga (tanga-yi nuqra) weighing rn.76 gm was being 
minted in Delhi. Umür's tanga-yi nuqra followed this standard and 
weighed exactly half the tanga of Delhi, i.e. 5. 3 8 gm. lt was divided into 
four dirhams. Presumably Umür's tanga soon ousted the above-men-
tioned lighter (dinär-i) khuräsänI of four dirhams, for in the period 
around 844/ 1440 there is no further mention of the khuräsänI currency. 
1 Rabino, "Coins of the Jalä'ir'', pp. 103ff. Hinz, "Ein orientalisches Handelsunternehmen", 
p. 327, and Resälä-ye Fa/akiyyä, p. 14. 
2 Ibid. Schroetter, p. 141. Smith, "The Silver Currency", p. 19· Herrmann and Doerfer, "Ein 
persisch-mongolischer Erlass", pp. 16- l 9. 
3 Schroetter, pp. 141, 147· Hinz, "Steuerinschriften", p. 762, following the Shams a/-siyäq of 
'AII ShiräzI, MS Ayasofya 3986. On the kapakI dinär, see further Barthold, Ulugh Beg, p. 8. 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE MONET AR Y SYSTEM 
Under Shäh Rukh the weight of this silver tanga was reduced to 4. 72 
gm, which in his day was the weight of one mi§qäl. In a very large part 
of the teritory under his rule, during the early decades of the 9th/ 1 5 th 
century, the coin assumed the name shährukhi. Moreover, this Timurid 
tanga at one mi§qäl was minted also in gold, although very rarely, and 
was called tanga-yi fillä. In later times it became the tillä, the current 
gold coinage of the Uzbek khans of Bukhärä, Khiva, and Khoqand. 1 
Even so, in the Timurid period various dinär currencies persisted. 
There is evidence from 844/1440 of the existence of the following: in 
Transoxiana there was the kapaki dinär at about 8 gm of silver. In 
western Iran there were as many as three different dinär currencies, the 
relationship of which to the kapaki dinär is known: the Baghdäd or 
Shiräz dinär, the dinär-i 'Iräqi, and the Tabriz dinär. The dinär-i 'IräqI 
seems traceable directly to the earlier Tabriz dinär-i räyij, whereas the 
dinär-i Tabrizi of the 1 5 th century must have appeared for the first 
time in Timurid times. At that time the relation between the four silver 
currencies was as follows: one kapakI dinär was equivalent to three 
Baghdäd (or Shiräz) dinärs, to six 'Iräqi dinärs and to nine TabrizI 
dinärs. Thus we arrive at the following average weights for the various 
dinärs: Baghdäd or Shiräz dinär = ca. 2. 7 gm; dinär-i 'IräqI = ca. 1. 3 5 
gm; dinär-i Tabrizi = ca. 0.9 gm.2 
There is one piece of information, likewise applicable to the period 
around 1440, that startles us: two kapakI dinärs are supposed to have 
been equivalent to one tanga.3 At first sight this would seem to con-
tradict our affirmation that under Shäh Rukh a tanga of 4. 7 2 gm had 
been minted. lt is possible that meanwhile, at least in eastern Iran and 
Transoxiana, the name we have already mentioned, shährukhI, had 
become so popular for these smaller coins that the name tanga could be 
used for another species of coin. A similar process can be observed 
happening in the time of the Aq Quyünlü in eastern Anatolia, where 
the terms tanga and shährukhI likewise denoted two different species of 
coin.4 In the kingdom of Lär also there existed at a later date a 
monetary unit called a tanga, but this did not prevent a larger coin, the 
läri, also being described as a tanga (cf. below). 
In the second half of the 1 5 th century the dinär currency of Iran 
suffered an incredibly rapid decline. According to Hinz, in 1440 one 
1 Schroetter, pp. 680, 694. On the shährukhl, sec TMEN n, l l l · 
2 Hinz, in Oriens x (19n), 369. 3 Ibid„ and "Steuerinschriften", p. 761. 
• Barkan, "Osmanh devrinde", pp. 10off., 187. 
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tümän-i 'IräqI, i.e. rn,ooo dinärs, was still worth on the gold standard 
3,250 German Gold Marks at pre-war standard (cf. below). Twelve 
years later the tümän-i 'IräqI had sunk to 1,200 Gold Marks. Under the 
Safavids the only currencies known were the 'IräqI and Tabriz dinärs, 
and we may assume that the distinction between these soon became 
purely formal, both currencies becoming equal in value. 1 We may, 
therefore, equate the tümän of 916/15 IO, that is of the reign of Ismä'Il 
I, with the tümän-i 'Iräqi of 1440 and 1452: it was worth only 270 Gold 
Marks. 
There is little information available on currency conditions under 
the Türkmen dynasties of the Qarä Quyünlü and Äq Quyünlü. In the 
time of Qarä Yüsuf, and presumably under all the other Qarä Quyünlü 
rulers, the legal tender was the silver dinär, at least in the form of the 
Tabriz dinär and the 'IräqI dinär. There are reports, however, which 
mention sums in tümäns. Besides these there were silver tangas weigh-
ing 5 gm or 5 .2 gm, and coins of Shäh Rukh and other Timurids were 
current also. What knowledge we have of the currency system in the 
Äq Quyünlü state, at least in its territories in eastern Anatolia, comes 
from the records kept in these territories under the reign of the 
Ottoman Sultan Selim I; and it is to these records, too, that we are 
indebted for our knowledge of Uzun J:Iasan's Qänün (cf. above). There 
we find the following data: one aqcha-yi 'U1mäni (the Ottoman asper, 
the gold value of which at the time was calculated by Hinz to be 0.20 
Gold Marks or 2-4d.) under the Äq Quyünlü corresponded to three so-
called qarqja-aqchas, also known as dirhams. One tanga is equated to 
two Ottoman aqchas, one shährüqi ( clearly a corruption of shährukhI) 
to six Ottoman aqchas.2 From this we may deduce: 
1 tanga = 6 qaraja-aqcha 
1 shährüqI = 3 tangas = 18 qaraja-aqchas 
From this comparison we learn that one "shährüqI" had a gold value 
of 1.2 Gold Marks, which, at the end of tlie 15th century, was com-
pletely in line with the gold value of the shährukhI standardised at 4. 72 
gm under Shäh Rukh. In the second half of the 1 5 th century the tanga 
of the Äq Quyünlü period, of which we have just spoken, was worth 
only one-third of the shährukhI. This tanga was probably restricted to 
only a few provinces. Also in circulation was a silver coin with a 
t Hinz, "Steuerinschriften", p. 762, quoting Chardin m, 156. 
2 Barkan, "Osmanh devrinde", p. 187. Schroetter, p. 181. On the aqcha, see Schaendlinger, 
PP· 57ff. 
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standard weight of 4.6 gm (or 5.z gm ifwe follow H.L. Rabino); and 
this coin, too, was called a tanga. In addition there were coins of half 
this weight, and even quarters and eighths of this unit. This tanga must 
have been the counterpart of the "shährüqI" we know existed in 
eastern Anatolia.1 Under the Aq Quyünlü, alongside a possibly 
multiple tanga currency, there was also in circulation the dinär cur-
rency, principally the dinär-i TabrizI. 
A further brief note on the gold coins of the Türkmen dynasties: we 
know of a gold coin of Jahän Shäh Qarä Quyünlü, weighing some 3.9 
gm; the Aq Quyünlü minted a gold coin weighing one mi1qäl-i shar' i, 
i.e. a "canonical mil!qäl" of about 3.4 gm. Probably these two coins 
corresponded to the ashrefi; the second one almost certainly did. The 
ashrafI was an originally Egyptian gold coin- which _had been minted 
since 810/1407. lt weighed 3.45 gm. There is proof thatMamlük ash-
rafI coins were in circulation in the Aq Quyünlü kingdom. There are, 
however, also records mentioning gold tangas of the Aq Quyünlü 
rulers.z 
We have already referred to the sharp debasement of the coinage in 
the course of the 15th century. This must be attributed to the fact that 
in the Safavid state the silver dinär was no langer being minted. But 
the dinär still remained what the tümän had been from the beginning: a 
unit of account. In this period the 'IräqI dinär was already equated with 
the Tabriz dinär as we mentioned above. This took place presumably 
as early as under Ismä'Il I. Other currencies based on the silver dinär 
now existed only outside the frontiers of the Safavid state, with the 
exception of parts of Khuräsän.3 
Under Ismä'Il I and Tahmäsp I, following the traditions of the 1 5 th 
century silver tangas were still minted. But the early Safavid tanga no 
langer belonged to any special currency. Tanga was now the name for 
a coin of a specific weight, the value of which was expressed only in 
dinärs or, which comes to the same thing, in fractions of the tümän. In 
the early years of his reign, Ismä'Il's silver coins weighed four, two, 
and one mi§qäls (18.7 gm, 9.3 gm, and 4.7 gm). Later on their weight 
was reduced on several occasions. The silver coin weighing one mi§qäl 
was worth fifty dinärs. The term tanga certainly applied to this coin, 
for its standard weight of one mi§qäl corresponded to the monetary 
1 Rabino, "Coins ofthe Jalä'ir", p. 117. 
2 lbiJ. Schroetter, p. 41. Barkan, "Osmanh devrinde", p. 101. Rabino, Coins, Medals and Seals, 
p. 14. J lbid„ p. q. 
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standard of the silver tanga of the l 5 th century. Thus the double tanga 
was worth 100 dinärs and the quadruple tanga 200 dinärs. 1 Under 
Tahmäsp the new term shähi supplanted the term tanga. One shähi was 
equal to 50 dinärs; the loo dinär coin was named the dü-sh.ihi("double 
shähi") and from 1540 weighed one mi§qäl (4.64 gm). 2 Under Mu}:iam-
mad Khudäbanda (985-95/1578-87) the name of the ruler established 
itself as the designation, khudäbanda or mu~ammadi, for the l oo dinär 
coin. In the l 7th century th~me khudäbanda was scarcely ever used. 
Under Mu}:iammad Khudäbanda and at the beginning of the reign of 
'Abbäs I, the mu}:iammadi weighed one mi§qäl (about 4. 7 gm).3 For a 
short time it was the most minted coin, until under 'Abbäs I 
(995-1038/1587-1629) a 200 dinär piece appeared, the 'abb.ist~ which at 
6.rst weighed two mi§q.äls and hence corresponded to the Timurid 
tanga. In l 5 9 3 the weight of the 'abbäsi was reduced to 7. 8 gm. Und er 
'Abbäs I the following silver coins were minted: the bisti worth 20 
dinärs, the shähi worth 50 dinärs, the mu}:iammadi worth 100 dinärs, 
and finally the 200 dinär piece, the 'abbäsi we have just mentioned. 
Besides these there were copper coins also called qaz or qazbaki. One 
qäzbaki used to be worth five dinärs. At the beginning of the l 8th 
century there were "small"and "large" qäzbakis, worth 5 and lo dinärs 
respectively. Copper coinage was minted in almost every city, but 
possessed its full value only in its region of origin; in the rest of the 
realm it possessed only half of its face value; it was re-minted annually.4 
From the second half of the qth century more silver coins came into 
currency: the hazär (i.e. "thousand"), worth 1,000 dinärs, and named 
also the patef-' abbäsi; and a dah-shähi or pänfad-din.ir, which, as the name 
indicates, was worth 500 dinärs. In addition, under Sulaimän there 
were two different 'abbäsi coins: the "little 'abbäsi" worth 200 dinärs 
and the so-called "large 'abbäsI" worth 2 5 o dinärs, also known as the 
panj-shähi.5 From the reign of 'Abbäs I until the end of the 17th 
century the weight of the Safavid silver coins had scarcely altered. 
1 Here we accept Hinz's suggestion in "The Value of the Toman", p. 91, as against that of 
Rabino, Coins, Medals and Seals, p. z8, who argues that the 10 dinär piece may have weighed 
9·3 gm. 
2 Rabino, Coins, Medals and Seals, p. l l · This coin used to be called fad-dinär or fadi also. 
3 Ibid. Hinz, "The Value of the Toman", p. 92. This coin was also known as a mal;miidi: 
Schroetter, p. l; Schuster-Walser, Das fafawidische Persien, p. 43. 
4 Schroetter, pp. lff. Rabino, "Coins of the Shahs", especially p. 310, and Coins, Medals and 
Seals, pp. zoff„ 3 zff. 
s Kaempfer, p. l4· Hinz, "The Value ofthe Toman", p. 94. 
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Only in the 18th century, under Sultän l:fusain, did the 'abbäsI, worth 
200 dinärs, drop to 5 .4 gm. 1 
We have already mentioned that under Ismä'Il I gold coins had been 
struck according to the monetary Standard of the Mamlük ashrafi at 
about 3.4-3.5 gm. Thus gold coins of 0.887 gm and 0.77 gm, struck in 
the name of Ismä'Il, were ! ashrafis.2 Gold coins minted under 
'fahmäsp and Mu4ammad Khudäbanda exhibit by contrast the 
monetary standard of the Timurid (tanga-yi) tillä (the gold tanga), 
which lived on in the gold coinage of the Shaibanids and Janids in 
Transoxiana. One gold coin of 'Abbäs I weighed 2.3 gm; it represented 
a half-tillä, and thus followed the tanga standard, of Timurid origin.3 
Later the ashrafi completely ousted the gold tanga coinage. However, 
alongside the ashrafi currency gold coins were struck which followed 
the 'abbäsI monetary Standard current at the time. And so there were 
gold 'abbäsis, mu4ammadis, and so on. As has been explained already, 
these gold coins scarcely ever found their way into circulation. They 
were struck on special occasions and used chiefly by the shah as gifts. 
We must not fail to note, however, that foreign gold coinage, too, 
principally the Venetian ducat (zecchino, d11cato) and the Florentine gul-
den (ftorino), were to be found all over the Middle Bast. In value they 
were always equivalent to the ashrafI.4 
In conclusion we shall examine the Iranian currencies in circulation 
outside the Safavid state in the 16th and 17th centuries. One of the 
most popular coins around the Persian Gulf was the lärI, minted in Lär, 
the capital of Läristän in southern Iran, a territory which in the 16th 
century did not yet belong to the Safavid empire. The lärI consisted of 
a double twist of silver purl, stamped on both sides, having a metal 
purity of 98% and weighing 4.8-5. 1 gm.5 This and the fact that in 1517 
this curious coin was not only known as the lärI but sometimes was also 
designated as "tanga" causes us to surmise that the lärI, too, originally 
had been struck according to the standard of the Timurid tanga. In 
1525 two lärI mintings were known: the "old lärI" equal to 3 tangas 
and 9 dinärs, and the "new lärI" equal to 3 tangas and 10 dinärs. In this 
t Vasmer, p. 181. 2 Rabino, Coins, MedalsandSeals, p. 28. 
3 lbid., p. 54. Schroetter, pp. 681, 694. 
4 Du Mans, p. H· Hinz, "Die spätmittelalterlichen Währungen", p. 303. Minorsky, Ta4!;kirat 
al-M11/ük, p. 59, arguing that ashrafi~i dü-b11ticould have been the Venetian ducat. Vasmer, p. 138. 
J.L. Bacharach, "The Dinar versus the Ducat", I]MES IV (1973), 77-96. 
5 Hinz, "Die spätmittelalterlichen Währungen", p. 304. Cf. Rabino, Coins, Medals and Seals, 
p. 16. 
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context the tanga, as a fraction of the lärI, must not be confused with the 
name also commonly used of the whole lärI.1 From these data we draw 
the following conclusion concerning the currency of Läristän: its basis 
was the dinär of Läristän; 1 2 dinärs made up one Läristän tanga; an "old 
läri", therefore, was valued at 4 5 dinärs, a "new lärI" at 46 dinärs. After 
the integration ofLäristän into the Safavid empire läris continued tobe 
minted, although relatively seldom, but their value was determined 
from now on only by the Safavid currency, for obviously a native 
Läristän currency no longer existed. And so: one (Safavid) läri= 125 
dinärs= 1! mul;iammadi=alrtümän.2 
In Hurmuz, which was under Portuguese rule in the 16th century, 
there were to be found in circulation at that time, besides läris, coins of 
a special dinär currency. In the middle of the 16th century they seemed 
to have stood to the Safavid dinär currency of the same period in the 
ratio of 4: 1. At the beginning of the 16th century there was a 1 oo dinär 
piece known as fadi, at that time the only silver coin in the dinär 
currency of Hurmuz. The 1 ,ooo dinär piece called the hazär was of gold 
and was also called the "half ashrafi". One ashrafi, called by the 
Portuguese "xerafim", was thus equivalent to 2,000 Hurmuz dinärs. In 
1 5 5 o hazärs were also minted from silver. There was also a copper fals 
with a nominal value of 10 dinärs. Until Hurmuz became absorbed into 
the Safavid empire in 1622, the Hurmuz currency steadily depreciated. 
In Transoxiana, namely in the Uzbek khanates, the tanga currency 
continued after the days of the Timurids; but it was accompanied for 
some time by the kapaki dinär currency. Rabino conjectures that the 
dinär currency in circulation in Khuräsän in 1 5 90 was identical with the 
kapaki dinär currency and is tobe traced back to the period of Uzbek 
rule in Khuräsän. Certainly at that time the value of the Khuräsän tümän 
was less than that of the 'Iräqi (Tabriz) tümän of the Safavids by a 
quarter.3 
In the following exposition we follow Hinz, whose research into the 
monetary system of Iran is of the highest importance. 4 W e can arrive at 
a useful value-index of the various currencies by expressing them in 
terms of gold. A precondition for this is knowledge of the value ratio 
1 Hinz, "Die spätmittelalterlichen Währungen", pp. 30.µf. (and cf. n.17). 
2 Rabino, Coins, Medals anti Seals, p. 16. Hinz, "Die spätmittelalterlichen Währungen", p. 306, 
following Tavernier and Charles Lockyer, An Acco1111/ of the Trade in India (London, 171 l), p. 241. 
3 Rabino, Coins, Medals anti Seals, p. 13, quoting f:lasan-i Riimlii. 
4 Hinz, "The Value of the Toman" and "Die spätmittelalterlichen Währungen". 
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of gold to silver - which was not the same at all times. This ratio was 
discovered by collating and assessing many data concerning money 
from various sources. In the 14th century the ratio was 1:12; in the 
middle of the 16th century it was i: 10; in 1622 it was again l: 12. About 
1660 the ratio rose to 1: 13 ! and by 16 So had reached the level of 1: 1 5 . 
In the early 1 Sth century the ratio went back to 1: 1 2. lt is clear that 
when the gold value of silver fell, a silver coin of fixed weight lost in 
value, and vice versa. 
Having taken these ratios into account, having assessed many parallel 
data concerning the nominal value of different coins and currencies, and 
having made use also of numismatic studies of monetary standards, we are 
at last in a position to make a statement concerning the gold value of the 
coinages underlying the currencies. 
In the following tables, in accordance with Hinz, we will express the 
gold value of lranian currencies and coins by means of German Gold 
Marks on the pre-war standard of 1913. The price of one gram of fine 
gold was then 2.81 Gold Marks. lt should be noted that the equivalent 
of one German Gold Mark in English currency is one Gold Shilling; as 
far as French currency is concerned, 0.81 Gold Mark = 1 Gold Franc 
(all rates pre-war standard). 
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A. Iranian currencies based on silver diniirs 
year kind of dinär Approximate gold values of one tiimän (i.e. 10,000 
dinärs), expressed by equivalents in German Gold Mark 
on standard of IjIJ (one gram of ftne gold being 2.Si 
Gold Marks) 
l. Pre-Safävid dinärs 
(. 1300 dinär-i räyij (Ghazan) 29,400.- GM 
(, 1320 dinär ( A bü Sa 'Id) 24,500.- GM 
(, 1380 kapakI dinär 19,500.- GM 
(, 1440 kapakI dinär 19,500.- GM 
(. 1440 dinär-i Baghdäd (d.-i Shiräz) 6,500.- GM 
c. 1440 dinär-i 'IräqI 3,i5o.- GM 
(. 1440 dinär-i TabrizI z,170.- GM 
1452 dinär-i 'IräqI 1,200.- GM 
z. Safavid dinärs 
1510 270.- GM 
1521 195·- GM 
lj 30 165.- GM 
1550 133.- GM 
1577 162.- GM 
1580 a9.- GM 
1593 100.- GM 
1611 83.- GM 
1660 n- GM 
1680 69.- GM 
17II 63-j GM 
1718 66.5 GM 
3. dinärs of Hurmuz 
c. lj20 jO.- GM 
t. ljjO 33.6 GM 
c. lj 80 26.- GM 
1618 12.7 GM 
OBSERVATIONS ON THE MONETAR Y SYSTEM 
B. Currencies based on tangas 
kind of tanga 
Timür's tanga-yi nuqra with a weight of 5. 3 8 
grams (after 1390) 
Timurid tanga of the 1 5 th century weighing 
4. 7 2 grams ( the so-called shährukhI) 
"large tanga" equalJing two kapaki dinärs, 
c. 1440 
"small tanga", coined by the li.q Quyünlü 
rulers in eastern Anatolia (late 1 5 th century) 
Approximate gold values of these tangas, 
expressed /Jy equivalents in German Gold Mark 
on standard of 19r3 
1.26 GM 
1.10GM 
0.40 GM 
C. Currenry of Läristän 
year 
1525 
lj2j 
1 j 2j 
15 54 
1615 
1627 
unit of currency 
"old" läri 
"new" läri 
so-called "small 
tanga" in Läristän 
läri 
läri 
läri 
Approximate gold values expressed /Jy equivalents in German 
Gold Mark on standard of 19r3 
i.67 GM 
i.70 GM 
o.44GM 
i.43 GM 
i.25 GM 
I.Oj GM 
After the monetary integration of Läristän into the Safavid empire one läri equals 125 Safavid dinärs 
